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Unjust Discharges From Employment:
A Necessary Change in the Law
CORNELIUS J. PECK*
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free,
to own property. The American ideal was stated by Emerson in his essay on
Politics, "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be
revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and free and propertied, if
they cannot work. To work means to eat. It also means to live. For many it
would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle on the curb. The great values of
freedom are in the opportunities afforded man to press to new horizons, to pit
his strength against the forces of nature, to match skills with his fellow man.'
At times one is tempted, despite the hazards, to make predictions
concerning the law of the future. The prediction made in this article is one
of the safest that can be made. Indeed, it may be wrong to characterize
what is said here as a prediction. So strong are the forces for the change
that it may be only the details of an inevitable development that remain
undisclosed. The prediction is that American courts will abandon the
principle that, absent some consideration other than the services to be
performed, a contract of employment for an indefinite term is to be
considered a contract terminable at will by either party, with the
consequence that an employer may discharge an employee for any cause,
no cause, or even a bad cause. Instead, courts will require that employers
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
1. Barsky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442. 472 (1954)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) states the rule to be: "Unless otherwise
agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to serve create obligations to employ
and to serve which are terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates the
employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events." Comment b gives emphasis
to the employment at will nature of the relationship by stating that a contract of employment for a
salary proportionate to units of time "does not, of itself, indicate that the parties have agreed that the
employment is to continue for the stated unit of time."
9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1967) (footnotes omitted) states:
Where the contract is not for a fixed term, and is, therefore, terminable at will, though
such notice as the nature of the contract made reasonable might be necessary, thereseems no
general principle analogous to that in the law of tenancies at will requiring notice ofa certain
length of time.
Corbin's discussion of the term of service of employment contracts refers to a disagreement over
whether there is an American rule and an English rule, and takes the position that"It]he question is one
of factual interpretation, and very frequently . . . a jury question." 3 A. CoRrnN, CONTRA Ts § 684,
at 224 (1960).
The Restatement of Contracts contains no provision relating specifically to contracts of
employment at will, but the treatment accorded usage would lead to a conclusion that contracts of
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have just cause for terminating the employment relationship. A further
consequence will be that courts will also require proof ofjust cause for any
serious disciplinary action by employers.
More than a decade ago a powerful argument was made by Professor
Blades for the development of a tort remedy to protect employees from
abusive exercise of power by employers.3 Somewhat earlier, Professor
Blumrosen had demonstrated that the treatment given contracts of
employment by American courts had its origins in the erroneous
statements of the author of a nineteenth-century treatise.4 A highly
respected attorney, with experience in government and private practice
and as counsel for a major union, later gave her persuasive arguments for
recognition of employee rights to job protection for the unorganized. 5 She
found support for her position in standards adopted by the International
Labour Office (ILO) that require "valid reason" for termination of
employment at the initiative of an employer.6 Those standards were
adopted after a study that extended over several years and reviewed
employment practices of member nations.7 More recently, Professor
Clyde Summers has presented for consideration his thoughtful proposal
that all employees be given protection against unjust discipline by a statute
providing for arbitration of discharge and discipline cases, using the
general procedures and standards as well as the corps of arbitrators
developed by the process of collective bargaining.8 As will be seen, some
judges have given attentive and even hospitable consideration to
arguments that employers should not have an unlimited right to terminate
employment for an indefinite term are terminable at will. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 246,
Illustration 8 (1932). See id. § 32, Illustration 1.
For numerous cases in which the conclusion reached was that th: contract of employment was
terminable at will, and therefore without cause, see Annot., 62 A.L.R. 3d 271 (1975).
3. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
4. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U. S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 428,432-33 (1964). See
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340.47 (1974). The erroneous
statement appeared in H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). Professor Blumrosen has
continued to argue against the principle that makes employment terminable at will and for job
protection for employees. See Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employmnent Opportunity: A Glinner
of Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268, 270-71 (1969). See also Blumroscn, Common Law Limitations on
Employer Anti- Union Conduct: Protection of Employee Interest in Union Activity by Tort Law, 54
Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1959).
5. Weygand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, in PROCEEDINOS OF NEW YOIIK
UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (T. Christensen & A. Christensen
eds. 1970).
6. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1966,
at 1060-61 (1966). The text of the recommendations may be found in Extracts from the International
Labor Office Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 446, 449-55 (1964).
7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 46Ti1 SESS., REPORT VII(l) ON TERMINATION 01!
EMPLOYMENT (DISMISSAL AND LAY-OFF) (1961-62) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONFERENCE, REPORT VII(l)].
8. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L,
REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Individual Protection], See Summers, Arbitratiot of
Unjust Dismissal: A Preliminary Proposal in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 159
(J. Correge, V. Hughes, & M. Stone eds. 1976).
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a contract of employment without cause simply because the parties have
not agreed upon a fixed term for the employment.
It is not the purpose of this article to restate, except in a limited way,
the persuasive case already made by others against preservation of the
principle that permits employers to discharge employees without cause or
even for a bad cause. It is instead to develop additional arguments to force
what is frequently a timid and reluctant judiciary to reconsider the
problem on the merits. Development of these arguments appears to be
necessary because, despite the appeal to academicians of proposals such as
that of Professor Summers, there is little chance of enactment of a remedial
statute concerning this aspect of the employment relation.
Usually, statutes are not enacted because they incorporate good ideas
or principles; rather, they are enacted because organized interest groups
lobby for their enactment.9 Employees who have not been organized by a
labor union are exactly that: unorganized and therefore lacking in the
unity of purpose and effort that produces a successful lobby. On the other
hand, employers have associations that traditionally have lobbied against
legislation conflicting with employer interests, and they may be counted
upon to oppose legislation that would curtail the present power of
employers to terminate employment without proof of cause. Nor can labor
unions be expected to lobby for the enactment of a statute to limit that
power of employers. The argument that a union will prevent unfairness by
establishing a grievance procedure is one of the mostpersuasive arguments
used to acquire members and organize a work force.' Unions are not likely
to work for adoption of a statute that would eliminate or greatly reduce the
potency of such an argument.
Judicial reform and revision of the common law do not conflict with
our commitment to a representational democracy in which controversial
policy decisions are made in the legislative branch of government. They are
instead in keeping with the best traditions of the common law, provided
the changes made do not conflict with existing legislation." Further, the
courts should take existing enactments as guides to the solution of related
and analogous problems. Thus, the entire process may properly be viewed
as one in which courts and the legislature engage in a cooperative venture
to improve the law, with the courts occasionally performing a catalytic
function to provoke legislative consideration of matters. Indeed, judicial
interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 now provides
unexpected protection for all employees against arbitrary or unjustified
9. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Las,, 48 MINN. L REV.
265, 281-85 (1963).
10. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: Lw AD
REALITY 99, Table 4-15 (1976).
I1. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 13-15, 18-24 (1969); Peck, supra note 9. at 285-93;
Peck, Judicial Creativiti' and State Labor Law, 40 Wsu. L. REV. 743, 772-79 (1965).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1976).
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employer conduct. This cooperative venture appears particularly
appropriate if, as will be argued, legislative inactivity continues to create
substantial doubts concerning the constitutionality of the currently
accepted principles of law.
This article will argue that important constitutional guarantees are
violated by continued adherence to the rule that a contract of employment
for an indefinite term is to be considered a contract terminable at will by
either party. This will, of course, require a showing that governmental
intrusion into the employment relationship has now become so
comprehensive and intimate that the permission granted private
employers by federal and state law to discharge without cause may be
considered "state action" in the fourteenth amendment sense. It will be
contended that the very important and constitutionally protected interest
in continued employment cannot be destroyed without observance of
procedural due process guarantees, and that discharge without cause
constitutes a deprivation of equal protection of the law to the unorganized
employees of private employers. Last, it will be shown that the
overwhelming importance of the employment relation to the individual
employee, coupled with the arbitrariness and capriciousness of a rule that
permits the termination of that relation without cause, necessitates that the
courts, in their capacity to shape common-law principles, reexamine the
suitability of that rule in the setting of the contemporary employment
situation.
A change to a rule requiring that employers have just cause to
terminate employment will give rise to a number of problems, both
substantive and procedural. As will be shown, the substantive problems
will not be unduly troublesome because of the readily available body of law
developed by labor arbitrators and because the problems are not
significantly different from those currently entrusted to triers of fact under
the common law. The procedural problems are more substantial and will
be considered in light of recent decisions concerning what process is due
for an interest found to deserve constitutional protection.
I. THE NEED FOR JOB PROTECTION
It might be thought self-evident in today's society that an interest as
important as employment deserves comprehensive protection, but the
glaring fact is that most workers in the United States have no protection
against dismissal without reason or for bad or improper reason. A few
examples may illustrate the problem and its significance for employees
whose employment is so terminated.
Assume a cashier-checker employed at a supermarket for several
years is told one day by the manager that the company has decided to
terminate her employment and that she should not report for work the
next day. If she inquires why she is being discharged she could be told that
management has no obligation to explain its decisions and that the
[Vol. 40:1
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decision to terminate her employment is firm and final. If the employees of
the supermarket are not represented by a labor union there will be no
grievance and arbitration procedure to protest the decision. Since her
employment was for an indefinite term, a court would hold under
prevailing law that her employment was at will and therefore terminable
without cause. When she applies for employment elsewhere, prospective
employers will inquire why her previous employment was terminated. If
she falsifies her application, that falsification may be discovered, with the
consequence that she is either denied new employment or later discharged
from that employment.13 If she reports that her former employer refused to
state the reason for discharge, that fact will often be interpreted to mean
that she was discharged for dishonesty.
The refusal of the supermarket employer to give a recommendation or
state the reason for the termination of her employment would not be
actionable,14 nor would it be of legal significance that the supermarket
management had assured its employees that they would not be discharged
without cause.' 5 When the cashier-checker makes application for
unemployment compensation, the supermarket management will have a
financial incentive to report to the unemployment compensation agency
that the termination of employment occurred for some reason that will not
adversely affect the employer's experience rating, and hence the rate at
which it is taxed to provide unemployment compensation. 6 If the em-
ployee is discharged on the basis of "misconduct," that employee will be
denied unemployment benefits, and the employer's experience rating will
not be affected;' 7 thus, in a given instance the employer might state the
cause of an employee's termination to be misconduct. If the employer does
so, the employee faced with denial of unemployment benefits may obtain
an administrative determination whether the disqualification is proper,
and that determination will bear a close resemblance to a determination
whether the employer had just cause for terminating the employment.' 8
But if the employer states a reason that does not constitute a basis for
denial of unemployment benefits, the employee is unable to obtain such an
administrative determination. If the management did in fact suspect the
employee of dishonest practices, it might well have decided that the
cheaper and less troublesome way of disposing of the matter was to state an
innocuous reason for termination of the employment. The cashier-checker
13. Reported arbitration decisions reveal that discovery of a falsified job application is
frequently considered by employers to be cause for discharge. F. ELKOURi & E. ELxOURi, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 658 (3d ed. 1973).
14. See Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 397 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Wis. 1975); McKinneyv.
Armco Steel Corp., 270 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
15. See Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,551 P.2d 779 (1976); Shawv. S.S.
Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
16. 1 B. UNEMPL INS REP. (CCH) 1120 (Nov. 2, 1976).
17. Id. 1970, at 4451-53 (Jan. 27, 1977).
18. Id.
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has been rendered unemployable in what may be the only work in which
she is experienced and one of the few occupations for which she is
competent, suffering the deprivation without hearing or proof of cause.
19
Of course, even when reason for termination of employment is stated
to the employee, no relief is available from the employer on the theory of
defamation because of the lack of publication. 20  The individual
supervisors who make such statements enjoy a conditional privilege2' that
will relieve them of liability unless they abuse the privilege, which may
require proof of reckless disregard of the truth.22 If the supervisors have
been reckless or willful in the statements made to one another concerning
an employee's job performance, those statements may be considered not to
have been made in the course of the supervisors' employment, with the
result that the employer has no liability.23 If the reason stated to the
employee is defamatory, reflecting upon the employee's honesty or
competence in his trade or profession, that employee will face the dilemma
whether to falsify ajob application or state a reason that will probably lead
to rejection of the application. Moreover, the discharging employer will
have a conditional privilege to make defamatory statements concerning
the character or conduct of the discharged employee.24 A decision of the
state unemployment compensation agency to the contrary is likely to be
viewed by prospective employers with considerable skepticism.
Given the favored position of employers, it. appears likely that
relatively few suits are brought by discharged persons who were employed
for an indefinite period of time and hence under a contract terminable at
will. The reported cases do, however, give an impression of the manner in
which employers use the power to terminate employment for any reason,
even a bad reason. Thus, according to the allegations in a leading case, a
business agent of a union was discharged for failure to commit perjury
before a state legislative committee. 25 Employees have alleged, and in some
cases it has been found, that they had been discharged for filing workmens'
compensation claims, 26 for making themselves available for jury duty,27
19. The events set out are essentially those related to me by a student concerning the termi-
nation of the employment of his mother by one of the largest retail chains in the United States.
20. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 766 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558(b), 577, Comment b (1977).
21. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 115, at 789-90; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593,
596, Comment c (1977).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note on Conditional Privileges and the
Constitutional Requirement of Fault, at 259-61 (1977); id. § 600.
23. Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 840, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595, Comment c (1977).
25. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P,2d
25 (1959), noted in 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 624 (1960).
26. Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 11. App. 2d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 51 111. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977); Framptoa v. Central Indiana Gas Co,,
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976).
27. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390,6 Cal. Rptr. 171(1960);Necsv. Hocks,272 Or. 210,
536 P.2d 512 (1975).
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for refusal to vote as directed in a public elections for refusal to falsify
medical records in a psychiatric service,29 for filing an accusation with a
state department of investment charging unlawful use of corporate
funds,3 ° for reporting to a friend and officer of a corporation that metal
tubing had not been adequately tested for the purposes for which it was
being marketed,31 for a married woman's refusal to "go out with" her
foreman after finishing the night shift,32 for refusal to comply with a
supervisor's demands for a sexual relationship,3 or for attempting both
within and outside the corporate structure to correct instances of
misleading if not fraudulent public statements concerning the employer's
activities.34
Other cases do not suggest such a patent conflict with public policy,
but nonetheless present factual situations in which the equities call for
relief for the employee or at least for some review of the basis for the
employer's action. In one case the plaintiff had been a supervisory
employee and was discharged one day short of completing thirty years of
service, which would have qualified him for a pension. He was discharged
despite an agreement made at the time he became a supervisor that if his
services as a supervisor ever became unsatisfactory he would be permitted
to return to his previous bargaining unit job.3 5 An employee who had
worked for the same employer for twenty-eight and one-half years sought
protection from a termination that he claimed was based upon a
conspiracy to produce an erroneous medical report, even though his long
service with that employer had rendered him unsuitable for employment at
an equivalent level elsewhere. 6 And it is understandable that employees
have sought judicial relief from a discharge because of a decision to enter a
night law school37 or a refusal to take a version of a lie detector test.3S
It is probably true that most employers do not misuse their power over
employees working under employment contracts terminable at will. A
business concern for maintaining good personnel relations dictates that
decisions not be made on an arbitrary, irrational, or unfair basis. But one
of the functions of law is to govern the undesirable conduct of those who
28. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
29. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
30. Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 CaL App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
31. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
32. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
33. Tomkins v. PublicServ. E. & G. Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnesv. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garberv. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Munford v.
James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). See Comment, 7tle VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53
WASH. L. REv. 123 (1977).
34. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aJI'd, 539 F.2d 1126
(8th Cir. 1976).
35. United Steelworkers Local No. 1617 v. General Fireproofing Co., 464 F.2d 726 (6th Cir.
1972).
36. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964).
37. See Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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do not conform to civilized standards of conduct. It is therefore
appropriate to give consideration to the dimensions of the problem created
by the prevailing rule concerning contracts of employment terminable at
will.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
In 1976 there were approximately 96,900,000 persons employed in the
work force in the United States, of whom approximately 80,000,000 were
employed in the nonagricultural work force.4 Union activity receives
considerable attention in the news media, but in 1976 only 21,000,000
persons were members of the unions,41 and somewhat less than twenty-
eight percent of the nonagricultural work force worked under the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement. 2 Those who did work under the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement were likely to enjoy contractual
protection against unjust discharge since approximately ninety-five
percent of the collective bargaining agreements contain grievance and
arbitration provisions, 43  and approximately eighty percent of the
agreements specifically require that there be cause or just cause for a
discharge.44 Employers have the burden of proving just cause for discharge
or discipline in cases that reach the stage of arbitration.45 Employees of the
United States government constitute another group that enjoys job
protection. In 1976 there were 2,879,000 civilian employees of the federal
government, who constituted about three percent of all persons employed
in the United States.4 6 Over ninety percent of these federal civilian
employees are tenured and enjoy the procedural safeguards that Congress
and the Civil Service Commission have provided against "adverse action"
taken by supervisors.47 In 1976 there were 12,169,000 state and local
government employees, of whom 3,343,000 were state employees.4
Reliable information apparently is not available on how many of these
38. See Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
39. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIll
UNITED STATES 1977, at 387, Table 625 (98th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1977].
40. Id. at 400, Table 654.
41. Id. at 418, Table 678.
42. U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEI9
ASSOCIATIONS 1973, at 72. Union members constituted less than 23% of the total workforce. Id.
43. U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1965), summarized In [1965] LAD,
REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 34-35.
44. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1 (Dec. 28, 1978).
Ninety-six percent of the contracts in the BNA sample had provisions relating to discharge and
discipline.
45. F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, supra note 13, at 621.
46. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1977, supra note 39, at 268, Table 441.
47. Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196,
198, 209 (1973).
48. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1977, supra note 39, at 306, Table 489.
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employees have civil service-type protection, but a conservative estimate
would be that more than half of them are so protected.4 9 There is likewise
no reliable information concerning the number of persons employed under
contracts with a fixed term, but common observation leads to the
conclusion that the number constitutes but a small percentage of the total
work force. It therefore appears that between thirty-five and forty percent
of the nonagricultural work force enjoys some substantial job protection
against discharge without just cause, and between sixty and sixty-five
percent of that work force is employed under contracts of employment that
are terminable at will and hence terminable without cause.
Another weakness in statistics concerns the frequency with which
discharge from employment occurs and the frequency with which a neutral
observer would conclude that the discharge was not for just cause. In its
1976 fiscal year the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
provided parties with panels from which an arbitrator could be selected in
22,090 cases and made 10,509 appointments of arbitrators.50 In 1977 the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) provided parties with panels of
arbitrators in 14,661 cases.51 Because of settlements reached by the parties,
only 5,550 of the 10,509 appointments made by the FMCS in fiscal 1976
resulted in an arbitrator's award,52 but 2,150 of the cases decided
concerned discharge or discipline.53 Assuming that the same proportion of
AAA cases for which panels are submitted result in an award and relate to
discharge or discipline, it would appear that approximately 3,500
discharge or discipline cases are decided annually by arbitrators appointed
by the FMCS or the AAA. Again, there are no reliable statistics, but it
appears likely that there are at least as many cases heard by arbitrators who
either serve as permanent arbitrators or are selected on an ad hoe basis by
the parties without use of an appointing service. If so, each year produces
around 7,000 cases of discharge or discipline of employees that labor union
officers believe to be unjustifiable and hence worthy of arbitration. The
judgment of the union officers receives vindication from arbitrators, who
overturn the management decision in somewhat more than half of the
cases. 54 It would appear likely that employers who know that their
decisions to discharge are subject to review in arbitration proceedings
would be much more careful about discharging an employee than would
49. "All of the states now have at least some of their employees under a merit system due to the
personnel requirements of the Social Security Act of 1939, with 34 states and practically all cities over
100,000 population having comprehensive civil service laws." Helburn & Bennett, Public Employee
Bargaining and the Merit Principle, 23 LABOR LJ. 618, 621 (1972).
50. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, 29Tr1 ANNUAL REPORT, FIScAL 1976 AND
TRANSITION QUARTER, at 49, Table 20 (1976).
51. Note, Study by Professors Julius Rezier and Donald Petersen, Lo)ola University'ofChkcago
on "Strategies of Arbitrators Selection," DAILY LAB. REP. No. 123, at D-1 (June 26, 1978).
52. Id. at 55, Table 26.
53. Id. at 56, Table 27.
54. Jennings & Wolters, Discharge Cases Reconsidered, 31 ARB.J. 164, 169,Table I (1976).The
management decision was sustained in only 44% of the discharge cases studied.
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employers not subject to such constraint.5 5 If so, at least 12,000 to 15,000
employees are discharged or disciplined each year under circumstances
that would have led to arbitration if they had been working under a
collective bargaining agreement and represented by a union. At least half
of the discharges would have been found to be unjustifiable. There are no
reliable statistics concerning the number of discharges that are withdrawn
as a result of negotiations in the grievance procedures established by
collective bargaining agreements, but if negotiation of discharge and
discipline grievances produces settlements at a rate comparable to that
experienced in other dispute settlement negotiations, the number of
discharge and discipline cases in the nonunionized sector that would have
been subjected to that process in a collective bargaining relationship could
be as high as 300,000 a year. Whatever the exact number, those employees
have no legal remedy because t.air employment was at will and terminable
without cause. The problem thus is substantial and causes severe injury to
many persons each year.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
The employment relationship has long received legal protection. The
employers' interest in that relationship found early protection in the
fourteenth century Statute of Laborers, which required able-bodied
persons not otherwise employed to perform services at regulated rates of
pay, and also provided remedies for employers whose servants were
enticed away by others.56 The latter protection of an employer's interest
continues today as a species of the action for interference with contractual
relations,'57 and, subject to a limited number of privileges, 58 the protection
is available even though the contract of employment is at will.5 9 Indeed,
until the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act6 and other contem-
porary labor legislation, the legal protection accorded an employer's
interest in a contract of employment, even though terminable at will,
provided a potent weapon against union organizational activities.61 In that
55. A study of arbitration discharge cases in which cases decided between January 1942, and
August 1951, were compared with cases decided between September 1951, and March 1956, showed a
higher rate of aflirmance of management decisions in the latter period, which the author attributed in
part to improved managerial discipline administration. Holly, Consideration in Discharge Cases, 80
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 684 (1957).
56. See W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-64 (3d ed. 1923). The Statute of
Laborers was enacted in 1350 to protect employers and society from the adverse effects of the labor
scarcity following the Black Death plague. Id.
57. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, Comment b (1939); W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 129, at
927-31.
58. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 767-774 (1939); W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 129, at 942-46.
59. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766(b), Comment c(1939); W. PROSSER,supra note 20, § 129, at
932-33.
60. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. f§ 101-115 (1976)),
61. The technique was known as a"yellow dog contract": an agreement that the employee would
not become a member of a union while employed by the employer was made a part of the employment




era of judicial hostility to labor unions, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized as a constitutionally protected right an employer's
interest in entering into contracts of employment terminable at will.62
The employee's interest in the employment relationship has also long
received legal protection. English law provided at an early date that if the
hiring of a servant was general, without any particular time limit, the law
would construe it to be a hiring for a year. 3 Moreover, no master could
"put away his servant" during the term of employment "unless upon
reasonable cause, to be allowed by ajustice of the peace." 64 Nor could the
master terminate the relationship at the end of the term "without a
quarter's warning. '65 Apprentices could be discharged "on reasonable
cause" upon the request of the master at the quarter session courts.66 At
this time, laborers hired by the day or the week who did not live in the
house of the master apparently did not enjoy these protections. 67 But
during the nineteenth century the English common law developed a rule
that, unless otherwise specifically agreed, employment could be terminated
only after a notice period fixed by the custom of the trade, or a reasonable
time if there were no custom, unless there was cause for summary
dismissal.68
Since 1971, employees in the United Kingdom have enjoyed statutory
protection against unfair dismissal from employment, dismissals being
unfair unless based on the employee's capability, qualifications, conduct,
"redundancy," or other substantial reason. 69 The protection extends to
unjustified selection for dismissal in the event of "redundancy,"70 and even
in proper cases of dismissal for "redundancy," statutory requirements exist
for advance notice and lump-sum compensation.7 The English
62. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adairv. United States,208 U.S. 161,175-76(1908).
63. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425.
64. Id. at *425-26. A servant might likewise leave a master upon allowance by a justice of the
peace.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *426. An apprentice might also be discharged upon his request at the quarter sessions
CoWrL
67. Id. at *426-27. Such persons could be compelled to accept work if able to perform it. Id. Fora
time in the seventeenth century the King's Council required employers to provide work in order that
there be no unemployment. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 56, at 380-81.
68. 2 J. CHITrY, CON-ACTs §§ 103, 1 lQ5 r.22 (22d ed. J. Morris 1961); F. MEyEns,OwNE suiP
OF JOBS: A COMPARATIvE STUDY 21-22 (1964).
69. Industrial Relations Act 1971, §§ 22,24,41 HAL. STAT. 2062,2088,2090,2091(1971 Cont.
VoL). See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 59TH SEss., REPORT III (PART 4B), GENE AL SURVEY
OF THE REPORTS RELATING TOTHETERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATION, 1963, No. 119, at
129-34 (1974); Summers, Individual Protection. supra note 8, at 513-15. The protection has been
continued intheTrade Unionand Labour Relations Act 1974, §§4, 6,44 HAL. STAT. 1766,1787,1789,
1790 (1974 Cont. VoL). See Covington, American and British Emplo'ment Discrimination Law: An
Introductory Comparative Survey, 10 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 359, 367-75 (1977).
70. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, § 7(7), 44 HAL. STAT. 1766, 1790 (1974 Cont.
VoL).
71. The time period of the notices, which must be given to any person continuously employed for
thirteen weeks or more, range from one to eight weeks, depending upon the person's length of service.
Contracts of Employment Act 1972, § 1, 42 HAL. STAT. 310, 311 (1972 Cont. Vol.). Compensation is
payable to persons who have been continually employed for at least 104 weeks. The amount of
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developments convincingly demonstrate that common-law traditions do
not dictate the absence of protection from unjust dismissal that
characterizes American law.72
The failure of American law to protect against unjustifiable dismissal
is also out of keeping with standards of other economically developed
countries, as well as countries with a lower level of development. In 1960
the Governing Body of the International Labour Office placed a series of
questions concerning termination of employment before the member
states of the organization. One question was whether the conference
should adopt the position that no dismissal should take place without a
valid reason.73 Of the sixty-four countries that responded, only Greece and
Japan replied in the negative, while Switzerland reserved decision. 74 To the
question whether an employee who believes he was unjustly discharged
should be able to challenge his dismissal before a neutral body,73 fifty-nine
of the sixty-five responding countries gave an affirmative answer.76 In
France an employer can be held liable for "abuse of right" in terminating
employment; in Germany an employer is liable for a "socially unwarranted
dismissal"; in Sweden an employer must have "objective cause" for
dismissal from employment.77 Although responses of member states to
a more recent inquiry of the ILO concerning practices that relate to
termination of employment may perhaps be self-serving, it nevertheless
gives one pause to read, for example, that in Algeria the grounds for
dismissal must be connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or
the economic circumstances of the employer;78 that in Egypt a worker
dismissed without justification is entitled to damages;79 that in Italy a
worker may be dismissed only for just cause or valid reasons;80 or that in
Luxembourg a worker who shows that he has been dismissed without a
valid reason may recover damages. 81
compensation is related to weekly pay and length of service and age. Redundancy Payments Act 1965,
§§ 1, 8, 12 HAL. STAT. 236, 238, 245, 287 (3d ed.).
72. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
73. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, REPORT VI1(1), supra note 7, at 65.
74. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 46TH SEss., REPORT VII(2) ON TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT (DISMISSAL AND LAY-OFF) 185 (1962) [herinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONFERENCE, REPORT VII(2)). In assessing the significance of Japan's response, it should be noted that
in Japan, a company is regarded as a familial organization, in which regular employees have lifetime
employment and discharges or dismissals are relatively rare. See R. COLE, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR:
THE CHANGING TRADITION 12, 113-22, 171-89 (1973); Pendergrass, Practicability of Anerican Per-
sonnel Concepts in Japan, in MANUAL OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN JAPAN 34 (American
Chamber of Commerce in Japan Employment Comm. ed. 1975).
75. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, REPORT VII(l), supra note 7, at 65 Question 8.
76. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, REPORT VII(2), supra note 74, at 188,
77. Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 8, at 508-19. This article presents a helpful
summary of the law on termination ofemployment in each of the countries and in Great Britain as well.
78. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 59TH S ss., REPORT III (Part 2), TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT, SUMMARY OF REPORTS ON RECOMMENDATION No. 119, at 2 (1974).
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id. at 67.
81. Id. at 77-78.
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Of course, employees in the United States are protected, as are
employers, from interference with contractual relations under existing
principles of tort law.82 In the typical case, the defendant sought to obtain
advantage over a person by persuading his employer to discharge him
unless he took desired action.83 Thus, a third party is held liable for
persuading an employer to do that which the employer may do with
impunity, demonstrating that the lack of protection against unjust
dismissal lies not in the unimportance of employment at will, but in an
assumed importance of preserving an employer's freedom to direct and
control a work force.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
The fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution in
tandem prohibit any governmental action, whether federal or state, that
deprives "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. 8 4 The fourteenth amendment also provides that no state shall "deny
to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, ' SS and
the strictures imposed by that clause have likewise been held applicable to
actions taken by the federal government.8 6 A necessary element of any
alleged due process or equal protection violation is that the challenged acts
can be characterized as governmental action rather than purely private
conduct.8 7 Thus, in determining whether a doctrine that permits an
employer under a contract terminable at will to discharge employees
without cause is violative of the foregoing due process and equal
protection clauses, there must first be an examination whether the
continued implementation of that principle has been the result of federal
and state intervention in the regulation of the employment relationship.
A. Governmental Intrusion into the Employment Relationship
1. Federal and State Regulation of the
Employment Relationship
The employment relationship is subject to comprehensive and
detailed regulation by the federal, state, and local governments. In
82. See notes 57-59 supra.
83. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 129, at 946.
84. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part: "IN]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I provides in part:
"INlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law -...
The protection of these clauses extends only to action taken by the federal and state governments,
and does not extend to purely private action. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
85. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
87. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
1979)
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
particular, government regulation extends to decisions to discharge or
discipline employees, and prohibits discharge or discipline for numerous
reasons.88 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648" makes it an unlawful
employment practice to discharge any individual because of that
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national o:rigin. The federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act90 protects persons between the ages of
forty and seventy against discrimination in employment. A very common
form of age discrimination is, of course, termination of employment for a
supposed lower level of efficiency and productivity. Most states have laws
that prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, sex,
or national origin. 9' Many states also have laws prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of other attributes, such as handicap or marital status. 92 Cities
and other governmental subdivisions have adopted similar prohibitions
against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, the effectiveness of which is indicated by the fact
that in some instances the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
defers assertion of its jurisdiction for a period of sixty days so that thirty-
one local agencies may first entertain those disputes.93 As of March 1978,
there were forty-two municipalities that had enacted ordinances to
prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.94
Since 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has prohibited
discrimination against employees or prospective employees to encourage
or discourage membership in labor unions in industries affecting interstate
commerce. 95 Such discrimination had earlier been prohibited by the
Railway Labor Act 96 with respect to employees or employers covered by
that law. Similar laws applicable to private employer have been adopted in
fifteen states.97 Thirty-two states have adopted statutes conferring upon
public employees the right to organize, thereby providing protection
against discriminatory discharges for those public employees who
previously did not enjoy the protection of a civil service system.98 Statutes
88. See Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 8, at 491-99.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Discrimination on the basis of race is also prohibited by the post-
Civil War Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
91. 1A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 451:101-105 (April 1978).
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.54 (1977). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is required by
statute to defer to state or local agencies that are authorized to remedy an alleged unfair employment
practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(c) (1976).
94. Bradbury, Young Lawyer Trustees Oppose Initiative 13, SEATTLE-KING COUNTY BAR Ass'N
BULL. 2 (April 1978).
95. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976)).
96. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.,, Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930).
97. 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1:42 (Jan. 29, 1979).
98. Id. at 1:46.
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protecting employees from discharge for union activities obviously require
review of an employer's decision to discharge or discipline an employee for
the purpose of determining whether that decision was motivated by
consideration of the employee's union activities; they may also result in
condemnation of employer decisions that are viewed as inherently
destructive of employee organizational rights.99 A measure of the
significance of such regulation can be obtained from the fact that in its 1977
fiscal year the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alone received
16,697 charges against employers alleging illegal discrimination or
discharge, and awarded back pay of over seventeen million dollars to 7,552
employees.1°
The Selective Service Act of 1940 required reinstatement of veterans
to their former positions of employment after discharge from military
service, specifically providing that a person so reinstated "shall not be
discharged from such position without cause within one year after such
restoration."'01 The Consumer Credit Protection Act provides another
specialized protection against discharge, prohibiting discharge because of
a wage garnishment "for any one indebtedness."'02 Several states have
enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against employees because of
their political activities, 10 3 because of acceptance of jury duty,'0' or for
refusal to take lie detector tests. 0 5 All states have laws protecting
employees from employment believed to be dangerous because of physical
conditions, 10 6 and many have protective laws concerning the length of the
workday, the age or sex of the employee, or the time of day at which work
is to be performed. 0 7 A familiar, although not universal, provision in such
statutes is to make it illegal for an employer to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee for having invoked the protection of
such a law.'0 '
The federal government by statute and by executive order" ° has
imposed prohibitions against various types of discrimination in employ-
ment upon contractors doing business with the government. Some state
99. See R. GORAN, LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 337-38 (1976).
100. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 11, 15 (1977).
101. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 6(C)(1), 54 Stat. 885.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
103. 4 LAB. RE. REP. (BNA) 1:45 (Jan. 29, 1979).
104. Id. at 1:42.
105. Id. at 1:42-43.
106. Id. at 1:39. Arizona and Mississippi apparently make requirements only with respect to
certain facilities.
107. Id. at 1:41, 1:37, 1:11-14, 1:44.
108. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-379 (West Supp. 1978); WAsit. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.17.160 (Supp. 1978).
109. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 503,87 Stat. 393 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976)); Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 92-540, § 402, 86 Stat.
1097 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976)).
110. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R: 339 (1964-1965 compilation) (nondiscrimination in
employment); Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965 compilation) (age discrimination).
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governments have done the same."' Among the prohibited dis-
criminations are discharge or discipline based on specified characteristics.
Judicial developments under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act
have extended the protection of employees considerably beyond the
prohibition of discharge or discipline by employers because of union
activities. The Supreme Court has found in those statutes a duty of fair
representation that runs from a union to all employees in a represented
bargaining unit." 2 Indeed, the duty runs even to employees not
represented by a union." 3 Breach of the duty of fair representation
constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, with the
consequence that an aggrieved employee is able to obtain the investigatory
and legal services of the NLRB." 4 This is of immediate significance when
the claimed breach of the duty of fair representation is the union's failure to
process properly a grievance concerning discharge or discipline. If the
violation is found to have occurred, the NLRB may require the union to
provide the proper services." 5
The basic duty of fair representation is violated when a union engages
in conduct that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. t 6 The duty
does not require a union to process all grievances of represented
employees, but it may not perform its duty with respect to grievances in "a
perfunctory fashion."'" 7 A union must handle grievances honestly and in
good faith, using the contractual grievance arbitration machinery with
some minimum level of integrity." 8 While there is some disagreement in
the cases, it appears likely that unions will be held liable for negligence in
the investigation and processing of an employee's grievance."'
Both the judicial remedy of a law suit and the administrative remedy
of a NLRB proceeding are available for breach of the duty of fair
111. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
112. For a general discussion of the duty of fair representation, see R. GORMAN, supra note 99, at
695-728. By basing the duty on the implications of the statutory scheme, the Court avoided deciding
whether conferral of power as bargaining representative was constitutional only if the use of that power
were subjected to constitutional standards. See the concurring opinion of Justice Murphy in Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
113. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). The result of the decision
was to prohibit a union of white trainmen from enforcing an agreement with an employer that would
have caused the discharge of black porters.
114. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). The filing of an unfair labor practice charge triggers the investigatory and enforcement powers of
the Board under § 10 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). It should be noted, however, that the
doctrine promulgated by the NLRB in Miranda Fuel has met a, mixed reception in the courts, and its
validity has been subject to question. See Modjeska, The Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38 Oi11o
ST. L.J. 807 (1977).
115. E.g., United Steelworkers (InterRoyal Corp.), 223 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1976); Truck Drivers
Local 705 (Associated Transp.), 209 N.L.R.B. 292 (1974), enforced, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir, 1976).
116. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1971).
117. Id. at 191.
118. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
119. R. GORMAN, supra note 99, at 720; Summers, The Individual Employee Rights Under the
Collective Agreement, in THE Durv OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 60 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
(Vol. 40:1
UNJUST EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGES
representation. The federal government has thus become involved in
providing remedies for discharge or disciplinary actions that do not have a
basis in just cause, requiring at a minimum a judicial or administrative
determination whether a union could in good faith have decided that a
grievance protesting a discharge did not deserve to be processed. And this
governmental involvement arises in cases in which an employer's action
has in no way violated federal law, but merely fails to conform with arbitral
standards of what constitutes just cause for discharge. It is an involvement
with what, except for the development of federal labor law, would have
been governed by the common-law rule concerning employment
terminable at will.
2. The Impact of the Civil Rights Act
on Managerial Decisions Lacking
Business Justification
The ramps constructed in recent years at sidewalk curbs for the benefit
of the handicapped probably receive much greater use by the physically fit
riders of bicycles and skateboards than by the handicapped. In somewhat
the same manner, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may afford white members
of the work force significant protection against harmful and unjustifiable
employer decisions that would be impermissible if directed at minorities.
Conceivably, protection against unjustified discharge or discipline may be
included in those unexpected benefits.
Decisions under the Civil Rights Act have established that employer
practices that have a disparate impact upon members of racial minorities
or women constitute unlawful employment practices unless those practices
can be justified by business necessity. Included in the practices found to be
unlawful because of a lack of business justification have been the
requirement of a high school diploma 20 or the passing of various
psychological tests' 2' to obtain employment. Also found to be unlawful
employment practices have been disqualification for employment because
of a record of arrests without conviction, 122 because of poor credit
records, 2 3 because of conviction of gambling, 24 or of a crime that is not
job-related, 25 because of adverse reports from prior employers if no
opportunity is given for rebuttal, 2 6 or because of failure to meet a
minimum height requirement.' 27 Probably most employers who learn that
they may no longer pursue such a practice with respect to women or
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
121. Id.
122. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
123. EEOC Dec. 72-0427, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 304 (August 31, 1971).
124. EEOC Dec. 71-2682, 4 FAIR. EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 25 (June 28, 1971).
125. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
126. EEOC Dec. 72-2103, 4 FAIR EMPL. PPAC. CAS. 1169 (June 27, 1972).
127. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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members of a racial minority voluntarily give ui, the practice with respect
to all employees and job applicants. Having learned that it does not serve a
business purpose, they may be expected to abandon the practice because it
creates unnecessary expense. The administrative inconvenience of
maintaining two parallel personnel policies would also urge abandonment
of the practice. But should employers refuse to abandon the suspect
practice with respect to white employees, the decision of the Supreme
Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 128 emphatically
indicates that the refusal would constitute a violation of Title VII and
section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., three union
employees, two white and one black, were charged by their employer with
misappropriation of property carried for a Santa Fe customer. The two
white employees were discharged; the black employee was not. The
Supreme Court held that the discharges of the white employees constituted
racial discrimination that violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and section 1981.129 It further held that the union could be liable under
Title VII for its failure to obtain for the white employees it represented the
same consideration that it obtained for the black employee.'30 Of
particular interest for present purposes is the Court's statement that
"[w]hile Santa Fe may decide that participation in a theft of cargo may
render an employee unqualified for employment, this criterion must be
'applied, alike to members of all races,' and Title VII is violated if, as
petitioners alleged, it was not. '
There is even less reason to permit an employer to discriminate
racially with respect to invalid job criteria than there is with respect to what
could arguably be valid cause for discharge, such as theft. It follows in
almost all cases that, if a test or other criterion may not be used with respect
to the employment of a black for lack of validation or business
justification, it may not be used against a white without constituting
prohibited discrimination. Possibly some tests with strong cultural biases
might have a disparate impact on racial minorities, yet would be valid
predictors of the job performance of whites. This would seem to be a
matter of proof for the employer-a proof which could be produced only if
the tests of other criteria had been differentially validated by' race.,32 In
almost all cases differential validation will not be possible,13 and whites
128. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
129. Id. at 279, 296.
130. Id. at 285.
131. Id. at 283.
132. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, issued on Nov. 24, 1976, required differential validation for minority and nonminority
groups wherever technically feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1977). There was no such guideline
concerning cause for discharge.
133. The technical standards of the Proposed Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures do not require differential validation. Proposed Rules § 14,42 Fed. Reg. 65,542,65,546-49
(Dec. 30, 1977). The American Psychological Association has taken the position that the hypothesis
[Vol. 40:1I
UNJUST EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGES
will therefore benefit from the protection that racial minorities enjoy
against employer practices not shown to advance the employer's business
interest.
Indeed, Professor Blumrosen has suggested that combination of
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. with another Supreme
Court decision under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may produce a
requirement of just cause for the discharge or discipline of all employees,
without regard to race or sex. 3 4 At the least, the combination creates a
strong force for movement in that direction. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green'35 the Supreme Court turned its attention to what a plaintiffmust
prove to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title
VII. The Court said:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.'
36
When a plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for establishing a prima
facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejection of the plaintiff. 37 A
recent per curiam decision of the Court indicates that such "articulation"
can be accomplished with less evidence than would be required to prove
the absence of a discriminatory motive. 38 But if the employer does rebut
the prima facie case with such an explanation, the plaintiff must be given
an opportunity to prove that the cause asserted was but a pretext for
racially motivated discrimination. 39 Only slight modification need be
made in this formula to govern cases in which the discharge of a formerly
satisfactory employee is alleged to have occurred because of discrimina-
underlying the concept of differential validation needs extensive research; in an amicus brief filed with
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, it asserted that when a differential validity test is not feasible
a carefully planned test that shows ajob relationship for whites will usually hold true for blacks. United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 914 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973). The reported cases concerning
employment testing do not appearto contain any examples ofdifferential validation oreven attempted
differential validation.
134. This particular possibility was first suggested to me by Professor Blumrosen in a
conversation, during which he expressed regret that other demands on his time prevented his
development of the idea in a law review article. The development that follows here is the author's, for
which Professor Blumrosen has no responsibility.
135. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
136. Id. at 802.
137. Id.
138. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978). A five-member
majority asserted that the Court's earlier decision in Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 98 S. CL 2943
(1978), had made it clear that "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" would sulfice
to rebut a prima facie case, and that the Court of Appeals had imposed a heavier burden on the
employer than warranted by Furnco when it required the employer to prove absence of a
discriminatory motive. Four members of the Court insisted that Furnco had made no change in the law
established by McDonnell Douglas.
139. 411 U.S. at 804.
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tion, and the courts have shown a willingness to make such modifi-
cations. 1
40
The Court in McDonnell Douglas spoke of rebutting the prima facie
case with proof of "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
rejection of a plaintiff's application, which suggests that the determination
will be made only on the basis of an objective evaluation of the validity of
the claim. The plaintiff in that case had engaged in an illegal stoppage of
traffic to and from the employer's plant, conduct that the Court considered
to constitute legitimate cause for refusal of employment when evaluated on
an objective basis. 141 The Court recognized, however, that the employer's
employment policies and practices might reveal that t he reason assigned by
the employer for refusing to rehire the plaintiff was pretextual. It therefore
would require an employer to be consistent in its use of what was found to
be "legitimate reason" for failing to employ an applicant.
The Court did not give specific attention to what would be required in
a case in which the trier of fact concluded that, viewed objectively, the
reason given by the employer was not a good one but nevertheless was the
real basis for the decision. Such a case might arise when the employer could
prove that he had used the same irrational reason to disqualify many other
applicants, all without regard to race. On a literal reading of the Court's
language, the prima facie case would stand and entitle a plaintiff to
judgment. This inference is reinforced by the Court's failure to disagree
with the lower court's reasoning that refusals based on "subjective" rather
than "objective" criteria are entitled to little weight. 42 It is therefore
possible that an employer will be held liable under the Civil Rights Act to a
member of a racial minority when the criteria used for employment or
discharge do not meet objective standards of legitimacy but instead reflect
only an erroneous or arbitrary judgment about employment matters.
If a black employee whose work previously was acceptable can place
on an employer the burden of proving or articulating that there are
objective justifications for discharge, by showing that the employer
continued to employ someone in his former job, may a white employee
likewise impose such a burden? White employees do not constitute a racial
minority, but the decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co. does establish that they are a class entitled to protection against racial
discrimination. As a matter of inferential reasoning, satisfying the prima
facie case leads much more easily to a conclusion that a black was denied
employment or discharged because of his race than it would with respect to
a white employee for the simple reason that racial discrimination has
frequently been practiced against blacks but not against whites.
Statistically it is also much more likely that the person who ultimately fills
140. Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass.), afftd, 545 F.2d 222 (Ist Cir. 1976),
141. 411 U.S. at 804.
142. Id. at 798.
[Vol. 40:1
UNJUST EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGES
the contested position will be white instead of black. But should not a white
who belongs to an unorthodox religious organization, or a white of
southern or eastern European ancestry, be entitled to an equally
mechanical application of the prima facie case? Can members of racial
minorities alone insist upon proof of consistency in the use of objectively
valid criteria for employment decisions? More important, can we tolerate a
legal system that entitles an employee who is a member of a racial minority
to force an employer to prove that a discharge was made for a legitimate
reason that it has consistently applied, but denies such protection to a
white employee?
3. State Action and Employment at Will
More than ten years ago Professor Charles Black correctly said that,
viewed doctrinally, the state action cases are "a conceptual disaster
area."' 43 Professor Tribe has recently concurred in that assessment, 44 a
concurrence made even more appropriate by recent opinions of the
Supreme Court in which narrow readings have been given to earlier
decisions. But those decisions have not been rejected or overruled and are,
therefore, apparently available for rereading.
The discussion in the two sections immediately preceding
demonstrates that the employment relationship is subject to intensive
regulation by both the federal and state governments. Of particular
significance is the fact that governmental regulation has become focused
on what constitutes justification for termination of employment, with the
consequence that employers may no longer discharge employees for
reasons that were legally unquestionable a few years ago. As the list of
forbidden causes lengthens, the implication is strengthened that there is
governmental approval of the remaining causes. Moreover, the courts and
the NLRB regularly pass judgment on whether a breach of the duty of fair
representation resulted from the manner in which a union processed a
grievance concerning a discharge. Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
caused the courts to determine whether employers had legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the employment of members of
racial minorities, members of religious or ethnic groups, or women.
Does this intensive regulation of the employment relationship with
respect to what constitutesjustification for termination of the employment
relationship make it appropriate to characterize a private employer's
decision to terminate the employment of an employee as an act of the state
or federal government? Three recent opinions of the Supreme Court, all
authored by Justice Rehnquist, suggest a negative answer. In each of the
cases, however, the Court was divided, and, as mentioned above, it did not
143. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Termn-Forew-ord:"State Action." Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
144. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON TrrTUTIONAL LAw 1149 (1978).
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overrule prior decisions, which remain as precedents to be reconsidered
when the occasion arises.
The most recent of the cases, Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,'45 sustained the
constitutionality of a provision of the New York Commercial Code that
permitted a warehouseman to foreclose a lien by private sale. In this
section 1983146 suit, it was contended that such a sale constituted state
action. Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. 14 line of cases148 that had found state action and due process
violations in state statutory procedures that allowed creditors to use
prejudgment garnishment and replevin remedies without giving the debtor
any prior notice and hearing; the basis of the distinction was that the
warehouseman's proposed sale presented no overt action by a public
official. The sale by the warehouseman was not a function "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State."' 49 Nor did the state's refusal to act with
respect to the sale convert the warehouseman's decision into state action
because, Justice Rehnquist explained, the Court has never held that mere
acquiescence in a private action converts it into state action. 15°
The decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 5' rejected a
claim that the action of a privately owned public utility in terminating
service for failure to pay charges constituted state action for the purposes
of a suit under section 1983.f52 The fact that the utility was subject to
extensive and detailed regulation did not convert its action into state
action.13 What was required to accomplish that was a sufficiently close
nexus between the state and the challenged action.' 54 That nexus was not
present, although the state had conferred a monopoly on the utility,15 the
utility provided an essential public service, 156 and the state had not
disapproved of the tariff provision permitting the challenged termina-
tion. 57 The Court's earlier decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,'58 finding state action in the racially discriminatory practice of
the private lessee of restaurant space in a public building, was not
considered apposite. That case, Justice Rehnquist explained, presented a
145. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
147. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
148. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See notes 192-97 and
accompanying text infra.
149. 436 U.S. at 157.
150. Id. at 164.
151. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
153. 419 U.S. at 350.
154. Id. at 351.
155. Id. at 351-52.
156. Id. at 352-53.
157. Id. at 354-57.
158. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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symbiotic relationship in which the state had so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the restaurant operator that it was ajoint
participant in the enterprise. 159
The decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis6 0 rejected the claim that
the action of a private club in refusing to serve alcoholic beverages to a
black guest constituted state action because of the detailed regulation to
which the state subjected those licensed to sell liquor. It did recognize the
right of the guest to an injunction against enforcement of a liquor control
board regulation requiring private clubs to adhere to all provisions of their
constitutions and bylaws, because such enforcement would require
compliance with a bylaw denying service to nonwhite guests. The Burton
case was again distinguished as concerning a symbiotic relationship, 161 and
the detailed nature of the regulation was said to lack significance because it
did not encourage racial discrimination.
162
In assessing the impact of these three recent decisions on the question
at hand, it should first be noted that state supreme courts are under no
compulsion to adopt the standards set out by Justice Rehnquist for the
purpose of determining what constitutes state action within the meaning of
the due process clauses of state constitutions. Moreover, they are free to
read the earlier state action decisions to determine whether, for the
purposes of state constitutional law, Justice Rehnquist properly read the
earlier decisions. Presumably the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court will also enjoy the freedom exercised by Justice Rehnquist in
reading former decisions of the Court.
Unexplored in Justice Rehnquist's opinions is the question whether
the lawmaking function of state legislatures and courts constitutes state
action that is subject to due process requirements, both substantive and
procedural. Conspicuously absent from his discussions of what constitutes
state action is an analysis of the decision in Reitman v. Mulkey.13 In that
case the Court affirmed the conclusion of the California Supreme Court
that enactment of an initiative that incapacitated the state from preventing
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing unconstitutionally involved
the state in private discrimination in such transactions. In Flagg Bros.,
Justice Rehnquist did recognize that a state may act through its judiciary
as well as through its legislature. Having thus negated the argument that
the statutory basis for the foreclosure sale alone constituted state action,
he did not continue the analysis to determine whether, as in Reitman,
judicial action under the statute would involve the state in unconstitutional
action. He found it sufficient to express incredulity that mere denial of
159. 419 U.S. at 357-58.
160. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
161. Id. at 175.
162. Id. at 176-77.
163. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
164. 436 U.S. at 165.
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judicial relief was sufficient to make the state responsible for private acts
that injured property. Yet in Reitman, plaintiffs sought relief against
landlords who had refused to rent an apartment to them; it was denial of
that relief in the courts that was the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim that their
rights under the fourteenth amendment had been violated. 165
Of course, Reitman v. Mulkey did not deal with "mere acquiescence"
in private action. Adoption of the initiative amending the state
constitution was a political act performed with the design and intent to
overturn state laws that previously prohibited discrimination in the sale or
renting of housing;166 the change in the law was viewed by the state
supreme court as encouraging private discrimination.'67 The action had
greater significance than mere repeal of statutes because it conferred
constitutional protection on those who would discriminate. 6' But these
distinguishing facts did not provide infallible proof of state involvement.
Instead, the majority in Reitman v. Mulkey reaffirmed the necessity of
"'sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on a case by case basis" to
determine whether a subtle involvement of the state in private action
constituted state action.1 69 The majority then referred to several previous
decisions in which it had concluded that a permissive state law constituted
authorization to discriminate. 70
There are by now many facts to be "sifted" concerning governmental
supervision and regulation of the termination of employment by private
employers. Given the extent of that regulation and the "nexus" it
establishes with discharge it becomes increasingly difficult to conclude that
failure to prohibit discharges without cause or for a bad cause is merely an
acquiescence in the private use of power. Failure to provide protection
against unjust discharge constitutes governmental policy that may
properly be viewed as permitting and thus condoning, if not explicitly
approving, arbitrary, discriminatory, invidious, or unjust treatment of
persons in employment. Moreover, an inquiry limited by notions of
"mere acquiescence" rests on a distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance-a distinction as wooden and unacceptable as the "right-
privilege" distinction that the Court has abandoned as a means of
determining whether an important interest has received the protection
under the fourteenth amendment to which it is entitled.17'
The inactivity of both courts and legislatures with respect to the
problem of employment at will is the result of the sovereign prerogative to
choose to do nothing about it. That choice must be made each time that a
165. 387 U.S. at 372.
166. Id. at 374.
167. Id. at 375.
168. Id. at 377.
169. Id. at 378.
170. Id. at 379-80.
171. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957).
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judicial remedy is denied an employee who contends that he has been
discharged improperly. Realists long ago demonstrated that judges make
law, and that the lawmaking function is state action. As Professor Tribe
has pointed out, it is of little significance to track down an appropriate
official actor in determining whether there has been state action; the
important thing is to recognize that a governmental rule is under
challenge.172 The fundamental question is whether federal or state law can
validly distribute authority between governmental and private actors as it
purports to do.
173
The opposition to such a broad view of the question of state action is
based in part upon the concern that it would characterize as state action all
private discriminatory or arbitrary action permitted (that is, not
forbidden) by state law. 74 But the law that currently governs the
employment relation differs from the broadly permissive law that applies
to many other areas. There are, for example, no laws about whom one
must have for friends or whom one must receive at home as a social guest.
The intensive regulation of the employment relationship has evolved not
only because employment ranks high among the interests incorporated in
the concept of liberty, but also because the contemporary employment
situation typically does not include a personal relationship between
employee and employer. Rather, the relationship runs between an
employee and a supervisory employee, both of whom work for an
impersonal corporation that employs hundreds of persons.'7 The
corporation has been organized under and by virtue of a state law.176 The
intensive regulation of the employment relationship reflects a societal
concern for actions taken within that relationship and distinguishes it from
other areas of law in which permissiveness is the rule. The manifested
social concern provides a distinctive basis for the conclusion that private
action affecting this relationship can now properly be viewed as
governmental action.
177
On the foregoing basis, it is reasonable to conclude that continued
implementation of the rule that an employer under a contract terminable
172. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, § 18-6, at 1171.
173. Id. § 18-3, at 1158-59.
174. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 915-17 (9th ed.
1975); Henkin, Shelleyv. Kraemer Notesfora Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L Rv.473,475-77 (1962).
175. For example, in 1972, excluding administrative offices, 6.2% of the persons employed in
manufacturing worked in establishments with under 20 employees, whereas 57.3% of the persons
employed in manufacturing worked in establishments of 250 or more employees. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT 1977, supra note 39, at 810.
In contrast, the 276,000 firms engaged in wholesale trade in 1972 had an average of 14.5 paid
employees, but more than half of those establishments had sales of less than SIOO0,000, which would
tend to indicate the median average number of employees per firm would be even lower than the
average number of employees. Id. at 829.
176. A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER 39-50 (1967).
177. Cf. Henkin, supra note 174, at 500. (Professor Henkin suggests that government
involvement in and regulation ofthedescent of property should provide a basis for invalidating private
attempts to discriminate by will). But cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (permitting reverter to
the estate of a testator who had left property in trust to a city for use as a park"for white people only").
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at will may discharge employees without cause is sufficiently bound up
with governmental action that the protections of the fourteenth
amendment are applicable. The matters left for consideration are whether
an individual's interest in the employment relationship is entitled under the
fourteenth amendment to the protection of procedural due process
guarantees and whether governmental adherence to this rule violates the
equal protection clause.
B. Due Process Protection of the Employment Interest
In determining whether the minimum procedural safeguards of the
due process clause are applicable in the private employment relationship, a
threshold question is whether the employee's interest in continued
employment that has been abridged with governmental sanction is a
"liberty" or "property" interest cognizable under the fourteenth
amendment.1 78 Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s expanded the
range of "liberty" and "property" interests entitled to due process
protection, with the Court conferring protection upon interests that had
not previously received constitutional or common-law recognition as
rights. 179 In 1972, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,'" the
Court stated a formula by which the application of due process
requirements is determined first by analysis of the "nature of the interest at
stake," followed by a determination of what process is "due" if the nature
of the interest is found to be within the fourteenth amendment's protection
of liberty and property.
That the interest in employment is sufficient to merit constitutional
protection under the fourteenth amendment was established early in this
century by the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Texas.'81 In that case
the Court invalidated a Texas statute that made it a crime for any person to
act as the conductor of a freight train without having previously served for
two years as a conductor or brakeman. In its opinion the Court said:
In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor, his liberty is restricted, his
capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied the
protection which the law affords those who are permitted to work. Liberty
means more than freedom from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee ir
an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of
mind and body in any lawful calling.1 82
That the constitutional protection extended to state regulation of
employment at will was soon thereafter made explicit by the Court's
decision in Truax v. Raich.'83 In Truax, an alien working under a contract
178. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1973).
179. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, § 10-9, at 514.
180. 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
181. 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
182. Id. at 636.
183. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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of employment at will18 4 successfully challenged an Arizona statute
prohibiting employers from employing less than eighty percent qualified
electors or native-born citizens of the United States. After noting that the
plaintiff was entitled to equal protection of the laws even though he was an
alien, Justice Hughes said,
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to
secure . . . . If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or
nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection
of the laws would be a barren form of words.85
Finding no special state interest with respect to the business in question-
operation of a restaurant-the Court concluded that the statute fell under
the condemnation of the fourteenth amendment.
A few years later the case of Meyer v. Nebraska'86 presented the Court
with the prosecution of a teacher of German under a statute prohibiting
instruction in languages other than English to students who had not
completed the eighth grade. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the
Court gave consideration to what is encompassed within the liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'"
The interest in employment has more recently been recognized as a
part of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment. In Morrissey
v. Brewer,'88 the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause establishes minimum hearing requirements for revocation of parole.
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that the liberty of a
parolee enables him, among other things, to be gainfully employed."89 In
Bell v. Burson,'9" invalidating a financial responsibility statute that
required suspension of a driver's license without hearing, the court noted
that deprivation of the petitioner's license would severely handicap him ;n
the performance of his occupation since, as a clergyman, he was required
to travel to three rural communities in Georgia.19' In Sniadach v. Family
184. Id. at 38.
185. Id. at 41.
186. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
187. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
188. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
189. Id. at 482.
190. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
191. Id. at 537.
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Finance Corp., 92 the Supreme Court invalidated on fourteenth amend-
ment due process grounds a Wisconsin garnishment statute that permitted
the holding of a defendant's wages without a prior hearing. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas noted: "We deal here With wages - a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.'
193
He observed that the taking permitted by the prejudgment garnishment
statute might impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families
to support, 194 a hardship that is as easily recognized and as certain to occur
when the employment is at will, as when it is for a fixed term. In applying
the holding of Sniadach to invalidate state statutes permitting replevin of
household goods without prior hearing, the Supreme Court majority in
Fuentes v. Shevin195 rejected a suggestion that Sniadach reflected the
special importance of wages.' 96 Although the Court has vacillated in its
treatment of the Sniadach holding, it has emphasized the importance of an
individual's interest in wages in determining whether due process
protection precludes use of summary procedures.
197
The Court has not explicitly recognized an interest in public
employment as an aspect of "liberty" protected by due process guarantees,
as it has done for the interest in private employment. In recent cases
concerning state and local employment, the approach of the Supreme
Court has been to determine whether an independent source, such as state
or local law, gave the employee what might be characterized as a
"property" interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The leading cases are Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth'98 and Perry v. Sindermann,99 both of which concerned employment
at state colleges. In Roth the Court considered the claim of a teacher
employed at a college at which the appointment system followed did not
create expectancies of reappointment. The Court concluded that the
teacher did not have a due process right to a statement of the reasons why
he was not reappointed or a hearing on the decision not to rehire him
because no state law or custom utilized by the university vested him with an
entitlement to continued employment that would amount to a "property"
interest protected by the due process clause. The majority specifically
noted that the state had not made any charge against him when it failed to
reemploy him, nor had it imposed a stigma upon him, suggesting that had
it done so the case might have involved an interest in "liberty" within the
principle of Truax v. Raich.2 °°
192. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
193. Id. at 340.
194. Id.
195. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
196. Id. at 89.
197. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601,614-15(1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974).
198. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
199. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
200. See notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra.
(Vol. 40:1
UNJUST EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGES
In Sindermann, the Court held that a proper cause of action was
alleged when a state junior college professor contended that the failure of
the college to grant him a hearing before refusing to renew his contract
deprived him of his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due
process. Although he was protected by no formalized tenure system
recognized by statute, the plaintiff would be allowed on remand to prove
the existence of a de facto tenure system arising out of "an unwritten
'common law' . . . that certain employees shall have the equivalent of
tenure"; 20' such a de facto tenure system would substantiate his claim of a
right to continued employment absent "cause" for termination, which
would, in turn, confer on him a "property" interest entitled to procedural
due process protection.
The divided opinions of the Justices in Arnett v. Kennedy,202 the most
recent case dealing with federal employment, make it impossible to state a
majority rationale for the results reached by the Court. At least six of the
Justices found that the plaintiff's interest in continued employment by the
federal government was a constitutionally protected "property" interest
because the act under which he was employed provided for discharge "for
cause" only. Thus, that interest in continued employment was entitled to
due process protection such that at least minimal procedural requirements
attached to the making of the decision to terminate the employment.*
0 3
Minimal due process procedures were required prior to termination even
though the employee was entitled to a post-termination trial-type hearing,
the result of which could be reinstatement with full back pay.204 Those six
Justices specifically rejected the position advanced by Justice Rehnquist
that the interest in federal employment could be defined and limited by the
statutes enacted concerning that employment and thus be limited to the
procedures established by those statutes.0 5
Given this background, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Bishop v. Wood 20 6 is amazing. The case began with a suit by a chief of
police who had been employed under an ordinance classifying him as a
"permanent employee." He challenged the termination of his employment
without a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cause for his
discharge. A majority of five Justices accepted the trial judge's
determination that under state law the chief of police held his position at
the pleasure of the city, and, therefore, state law did not give him a
property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. In a marked
departure from its holding in Perry v. Sindernann,20 7 the Court refused to
201. 408 U.S. at 602-03.
202. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
203. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and White concluded that the procedures established bystatute
and regulation satisfied the requirements of due process. Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan
would have found those procedures to be inadequate.
204. 416 U.S. at 145-46.
205. Id. at 166, 177, 210.
206. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
207. See notes 199-201 and accompanying text supra.
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examine whether the city's employment practices and policies had created
among its police force an objectively reasonable expectation of continued
employment absent cause for discharge, which would, under Sindermann,
constitute a "property" interest entitled to due process protection.
The majority also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the reasons given
for his discharge constituted a stigma that might severely damage his
reputation in the community, largely because the reasons for that
discharge were not made public. The Court assumed that discharge for
reasons that are not made public has no more severe effect on an employee
than refusal to renew a contract after employment for an agreed-upon
fixed term, which the Court had previously held in Roth did not impair an
interest in "liberty" protected under the fourteenth amendment. The
Court's assumption ignores the reality of the employment situation, A
refusal to renew after a fixed term when there are no practices or
administrative standards that determine eligibility for reemployment does
not carry with it a strong implication of unfitness. The fixed term of
employment is, in essence, a trial period in which excellence may be
pursued or personal preferences tested. On the other hand, the practice
with regard to discharge under a contract terminable at will is to discharge
only for cause-for some inadequacy of performance; the strong impli-
cation is that the discharge is premised upon the employee's unfitness.
Whether there has been an injury to the employee's reputation because of
the discharge, such that his constitutionally sanctioned interest in "liberty"
• 208
is endangered, would appear to be a factual matter requiring an
evidentiary determination, but the Court did not require one here.
269
Moreover, the majority's decision in Bishop v. Woodwas based on its
unanalyzed assumption that a state rule allowing termination of
employment at will was constitutionally valid.210 Plaintiff had not
challenged that proposition because he believed his employment was not at
will, but rather was permanent under the ordinance, and that this
conferred on him a property interest protected by due process guarantees.
The assumed validity of the rule led the majority to conclude that the truth
or falsity of the reasons given for the discharge were relevant only to
whether the decision to discharge was prudent, but irrelevant to his claim
that his constitutionally protected interest in liberty had been impaired."1 '
208. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
209. The reasons for the discharge of the chief of police had been communicated orally to him In
private and first appeared in public as the answer to an interrogatory filed in the law suit. Equating the
failure to renew a contract for a fixed term, which had been at issue in Roth, with a discharge, the
majority concluded that there was no deprivation of liberty in the dischat ge of a public employee whose
position is terminable at will when there is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge. 426
U.S. at 348. The fact that the reasons given for his discharge might be false and the assumption (for the
purposes of summary judgment) that his discharge was a mistake did not enhance his claim of
deprivation of liberty because the Constitution could not, in the majority's opinion, be construed
to require federal judicial review for every error in the multitude of personnel decisions made by
public agencies. Id. at 349-50.
210. Indeed, one of the analytical defects of all cases that deal with public employment is the
assumed validity of the employment at will rule.
211. 426 U.S. at 349.
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But if the interest in remaining employed enjoyed constitutional
protection, as this article contends it should, discharge for a bad reason
would be relevant to the due process claim. Furthermore, the majority
incorrectly assumed that an examination of whether minimal due process
procedural requirements attached to termination of employment at will
would inevitably lead to judicial review to determine whether the correct
decision was made; the due process clause might require only review to
assure that there had been compliance with those minimal procedural
requirements.
The basic fault in Bishop v. Wood is its misreading of the earlier
established standards for determining what constitutes a constitutionally
protected "property" interest. The majority opinion in Roth did not state
that constitutional protection extends only to property interests created by
state law. It said, rather, that the protected interests "are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law. ' 1 Those sources included "rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those- benefits. '1 Roth's companion case, Perry v.
Sindermann, specifically stated that the "'property' interests subject to
procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical
forms. 21 4 The "property" interest recognized in Sinderniann did not arise
out of a statutory or judge-made rule of state law, but rather was derived
from "an unwritten 'common law' . . . that certain employees shall have
the equivalent of tenure. 21 5 That there would have been an "understan-
ding" and a supported claim in Bishop v. Wood that a "permanent
employee" would not be discharged except for cause seems most natural;
the existence of an understanding of permanent employment absent cause
for discharge most certainly was not eviscerated by citation of a state court
decision permitting the termination of the employment of a school teacher
at the end of the school year without filing charges or giving reasons. 6 But
in sustaining the motion for a summary judgment the majority in Bishop v.
212. 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). The error of limiting the property interests to those
created by state law has been compounded and reinforced byJustice Rehnquist in Board of Curators of
the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), when he states, "Because property interests are
creatures of state law, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, at 599-603 (1972), respondent would have
been required to show at trial that herseat at the Medical School was a'property' interest recognized by
Missouri state law." 435 U.S. at 82. But references to the cited pages of the decision in Sindermann
brings one to a discussion indicating that protected "property" interests are not limited to those
formally recognized under state law. Justice Rehnquist's reliance upon Sindermann for the stated
proposition is not justified by the Sinderniann text.
213. 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
214. 408 U.S. at 601.
215. Id. at 602. The Court made reference to labor arbitration cases in which a "common law of a
particular industry or a particular plant" might supplement a collective bargaining agreement, citing
one of the decisions in the Steelworkers trilogy of arbitration cases. Id. That decision, United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), made it clear that an arbitrator
was not limited to traditional sources of law or required to reach thesame conclusion as would a court.
216. That was the holding in Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971), which was
accepted as the North Carolina law on the subject.
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Wood did not look beyond the interests that had been recognized under
state law.
At the outset, this limitation of constitutional protections to interests
established by substantive state law assumes an artificial distinction
between the procedural protections of the Constitution and rights created
by substantive law. The theory adhered to by the majoriiy assumes that
courts can, in assessing whether a particular interest deserves due process
protection, isolate the substantive law of a state, and determine whether a
particular interest can be characterized as "property" thereunder, without
regard to the constitutional considerations that prompt the inquiry. Yet, to
the extent that a constitutional procedural protection exists there also
exists a substantive right. To the extent that procedural protections are
withdrawn the substantive right is diminished. Professor Tribe has pointed
out that while Sniadach and Fuentes were conceived as providing
procedural protection for wage earners and debtors, the consequence was
to work a change in the state substantive law. 2 7 After the decision in
Fuentes, debtors had an enlarged measure of quiet enjoyment of property
that previously could be obtained under state law only by those who could
afford to pay for it. That enlarged right was not found in preexisting state
law; it was created by the procedural protection accorded conditional
vendees prior to repossession of the property purchased even though they
might ultimately lose on the merits of their contract claims. It is apparent
that constitutional notions of "property" interests guaranteed due process
are broader than state property law concepts.
A more fundamental error exists in the Bishop v. Wood majority
opinion, however. In limiting the procedural protections of the due process
clause to only those interests that can be characterized as "property" under
the state substantive law, the majority conferred upon the states
" 'unfettered discretion' in defining 'property' for purposes of the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution., 21 8 In so doing, Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the majority resurrected the long
abandoned right-privilege distinction, "for a State may now avoid all due
process safeguards . ..merely by labeling [the interest at issue] as not
constituting 'property.' ,,219 The notion that the customs and reasonable
expectations of the parties in the employment relationship are not alone
sufficient to give the employee a "property" interest in continued
employment absent cause for discharge reflects the rationale of the
discredited right-privilege distinction: the state can decline to characterize
any interest at all as "property" and thus deny it due process protection, or
it can grant that status and the accompanying constitutional protection in
any manner it chooses.2 Such a construction of the due process clause
217. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, at 1110.
218. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 353-54 n.4.
220. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, at 524.
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would permit the states to define the extent of their obligations under the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
In order to avoid this circular construction of the due process clause, it
must be recognized that property interests protected by the due process
clause are not limited to those characterized as such under the state
substantive law. Rather, in determining the coverage of due process
protection the starting point should be the "nature of the interest at
stake,"22' and it should be recognized that "property" interests "are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law."222 If the rules or
understandings that constitute the source of protected "property" interests
do not arise exclusively from state law, but instead may develop from a
practical and nonlegal appraisal of the human significance of the interest
223
affected, the conclusion follows that the interest in continued
employment, by its nature, deserves due process protection. And other
recent cases, not overruled, have conferred constitutional protection upon
interests that rank below employment by almost any practical appraisal.224
It is true that in recent years the Supreme Court has narrowed the
protection offered to various interests. 22 5 Thus, in Paul v. Davis 6 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that due process principles were
not violated when police, without prior hearing, put plaintiffs name and
photograph on a flyer describing him as a known shoplifter. Misreading
the Court's prior decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,227 Justice
Rehnquist stated for the majority that injury to reputation, standingalone,
did not constitute a deprivation of either liberty or property. But
Constantineau and the cases upon which it relied remain standing
precedent, awaiting a proper rereading when the occasion arises, and the
limiting effect need not be permanent. Moreover, language in the
opinion229 suggested that injury to reputation stemming from the
termination of employment might still be considered an interest in
"liberty" protected under the due process clause.
221. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
222. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
223. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
224. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten-day suspension from a public school); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoner's "good time" credits); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973) (probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (purchaser's interest in a stove, stereo set, and otherfurniture); Wisconsin v. Constantineau,400
U.S. 433 (1971) (stigma of public identification as an excessive drinker). It should be remembered that
in the leading case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), plaintiffs were indisputably entitled to an
eventual trial-type hearing on the merits of their eligibility for welfare benefits; the issue before the
Court was whether they had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of benefits. Id.
at 259-60.
225. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, §§ 10-10, 10-11, at 522-32.
226. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
227. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
228. 424 U.S. at 701. See L. TRIBE, supra note 144, § 10-11, at 528-29.
229. Id. See L. TRIBE, supra note 144, § 10-11, at 528.
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There is in the majority decision in Paul v. Davis an implication that
the presence of a remedy under state tort law for defamation provides at
least a partial explanation for the conclusion that there was no violation of
the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.230 Ingraham v.
Wright23' is another limiting case, holding that due process does not
require a hearing prior to the administration of corporal punishment to
students in a public school. The majority found that use of corporal
punishment in public schools implicated a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, but explicitly adopted the view that the presence of state
common-law tort remedies was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process. 232 If the rationale of these limiting cases is that when state law
provides an adequate protection for important interests additional
procedural due process requirements do not attach, they suggest the
conclusion that procedural due process requirements should attach if state
substantive law provides no protection for an interest as important as that
of continued employment and employability.2 33
Thus, a survey of the Supreme Court opinions delineating the range of
interests protected under the due process clause provides a sturdy
foundation for the conclusion that an employee's interest in continued
employment under a contract with an indefinite term is such a protected
interest. Decisions early in this century established that the right to
continued employment is an essential component of the "liberty" interest
guaranteed due process safeguards. More recent decisions under the due
process clause support the contention that the injury to reputation arising
from termination of employment under an indefinite term contract
implicates the "liberty" aspects of the fourteenth amendment. Cases
dealing with termination of public employment suggest that the
understandings and reasonably induced expectations of the parties to an
employment contract of indefinite term may be relevant in assessing
230. Id. at 697-99, 712. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, id. at 715 (Brennan, J,,
dissenting).
231. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
232. Id. at 672, 675-80.
233. Comparable support may be found in what would otherwise appear to bea limiting case,
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which it was held that an evidentiary hearing of the sort
required before termination of welfare payments was not required pTior to termination of disability
insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. An important part of the rationale set forth by J ustice
Powell for the majority was that the prescribed procedures for termination of the benefits provided a
claimant an effective process for asserting his claim prior to administrative action and that those
procedures went far to establish the fairness and reliability of the conclusions reached. Id. at 343, 349.
Of course, the stated concern for the administrative burden and expense of pretermination hearings, Id,
at 347, 348, presses in the other direction, but that concern was partially prompted by knowledge that
the existing procedures already provided for an evidentiary post-termination hearing, Id. at 339.
The recent decision in Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), might also be viewed as a limiting case,
It held that a discharged public employee was not entitled to a hearing because he had not asserted the
falsity of a report that led to the termination of his employment. Perhaps it was wrong, as argued by the
dissentingjustices, to require the employee to allege the falsity of a stigmatizing report, but the pleading
problem will not be insuperable in cases in which a discharge does falsely impose a stigma upon an
employee. The majority assumed the continued vitality of Roth's indication that improper imposition
of a stigma would entitle the employee to a hearing.
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whether that employment relationship constitutes a "property" interest
deserving due process protection. In the context of the modem
employment situation, the understanding would seem to be that an interest
as important as that in continued employment would not be subject to
sudden termination on an arbitrary basis. The Supreme Court's
determination in Perry v. Sindermann23 4 makes it clear that such an
understanding would vest the employee with an entitlement to continued
employment absent cause for discharge that would amount to a "property"
interest subject to the procedural safeguards of the due process clause. In
addition, a fair appraisal of the Court's decisions in this area would
indicate that the recognition of these constitutional rights would work a de
facto change in state substantive law, 235 and afford employees a further
measure of protected.enjoyment of their rights to continued employment.
A consideration of what process is due when the state sanctions
arbitrary discharge under a contract of employment with an indefinite
term will be taken up below. At this point, the state's role in implementing
this scheme of employment relations will be scrutinized under the equal
protection standard of the fourteenth amendment.
C. Equal Protection Scrutiny of Employment Contracts
Terminable at Will
While a significant proportion of the employees in private employ-
ment and approximately one-half of the employees in public employment
are legally protected against discharge or discipline that is unjust, without
cause, or for a bad cause, it is an obvious and undeniable fact that most
employees in the private sector are not.2 3 6 Moreover, federal law imposes
upon unions acting as collective bargaining representatives an affirmative
obligation to act in good faith in protecting represented employees from
discharge or discipline that is unjust, without cause, or for bad cause.237
The protection public employees receive from civil service laws is
reinforced by the constitutional protection given to many of those
employees.238 Whether the government's refusal to accord protection
against arbitrary discharge to employees working under a contract with an
indefinite term, as it has done for significant numbers of other employees,
constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law will depend on the
importance that the courts, acting as arbiters of societal values, attach to
the interest in employment and on the strictness with which the courts
234. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
235. See note 201 and accompanying text supra.
236. See text accompanying notes 39-55 supra. The assertion of this inequality of protection is
subject to the caveat that an unintended effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been to conferjob
protection on all employees whose employment is subject to the protection of that Act. See text
accompanying notes 120-42 supra.
237. See text accompanying notes 112-19 supra.
238. See text accompanying notes 198-216 supra.
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scrutinize asserted justifications for the differential treatment. Recent
developments in the Supreme Court's approach to equal protection
problems make less likely, but most certainly do not bar, the conclusion
that the differential treatment is a prohibited denial of equal protection of
the law.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court establi;hed a test of minimum
rationality for the classifications established by state law in regulation of
economic matters, pursuant to which a classification would withstand a
challenge if its establishment could be reasonably related to the legislative
purpose for which the state acted.239 The test included a considerable
tolerance for overinclusion and underinclusion in the categories
established. 240 The Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren,
substantially developed equal protection analysis with its recognition of
"fundamental rights" and "suspect classifications." The existence of either
would result in strict scrutiny to determine whether a compelling state
interest was served by a legislative classification, and whether that
classification was drawn with some precision.241 The Burger Court has not
repudiated the Warren Court's development of 'this two-tier model of
review, but it has manifested an unwillingness to expand upon the list of
fundamental interests that evoke strictjudicial scrutiny in equal protection
contexts. 242 On the other hand, the Burger Court has been more de-
manding of proof of a rational basis for classifications that serve an
articulated state purpose, using what Professor Gunther has called a test
of "minimum scrutiny with bite.,
243
In 1976 the Court gave specific consideration to an equal protection
claim in an employment context. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia244 presented a challenge to a statute that required the retirement of
uniformed state police officers who had attained the age of fifty. The
majority's per curiam opinion concluded that the appropriate standard by
which to test whether compulsory retirement at age fifty violated equal
pr,tection was that of "rational basis," which it characterized as "a
relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the
drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and
239. L. TRIBE, supra note 144, § 16-2, at 995.
240. Id. § 16-4, at 997-99.
241. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972).
242. Id. at 12-18. For recent illustrations of the Court's reluctance, see Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972), and San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Llndsey,
a majority of the Court refused to consider the interest in housing to be a fundamental right, turning
back an equal protection attack on the summary procedures of the Oregon Forcible Entry and
Wrongful Detainer Act. The Court did, however, invalidate the statute's requirement of a bond for
double the amount of the rent for the purposes of appeal as an arbitrary and irrational discrimination
against the poor. In Rodriguez the Court refused to consider the interest in education to be a
fundamental right, with the consequence that differences in educational expenditures between school
districts in Texas were not found to be a denial of equal protection of the law,
243. Gunther, supra note 241, at 20-24.
244. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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an unavoidable one., 245 It found the decision to mandate retirement at age
fifty to be rationally related to the state's objective of assuring physical
preparedness of the officer, noting that physical ability generally declines
with age and that there was no showing that only a few officers over the age
246of fifty would be unqualified for service.
The Murgia majority specifically rejected the argument that the
statute should be tested for equal protection purposes with the standard of
strict scrutiny,247 refusing to consider uniformed state police officers a
suspect class. Nor did old age, in the majority's opinion, define a "discrete
and insular" group in need of extraordinary protection under the strict
scrutiny test.248 The court also rejected an argument that the employment
interest of an officer was a fundamental right, but it did so by saying that its
prior decisions gave "no support to the proposition that a right of
governmental employment per se is fundamental. '249 The Court did not
consider the distinct question whether the interest in private employment,
which a number of decisions have placed in that bundle of interests
constituting liberty,25° is a fundamental right for the purpose of testing
state law under equal protection standards.
It should also be noted that the retirement requirement in Murgia was
derived from a statute that incorporated the legislature's deliberate choice
made after study by a special commission.251 This, and a concession that
there was a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing
physical ability to respond to the demands of the job, obviously
strengthened the case for finding rationality in the challenged rule. The
statute also withstood an attack that the state had erred in not using annual
individual physical examinations, as was done for officers between the ages
of forty and fifty years, instead of the automatic rule requiring
retirement.252
The haphazard way in which job protection has been extended to
some employees but not to those in private employment working under an
indefinite term contract demonstrates that the present situation is not the
product of any deliberate legislative consideration whether there is a
desired purpose served by characterizing employment for an indefinite
term as employment at will. An equal protection challenge to that rule
therefore is not a challenge to the decision made by elected representatives
or to the system of representational democracy generally. The judicially
245. Id. at 314.
246. Id. at 315-16.
247. Id. at 312.
248. 427 U.S. at 313.
249. Id.
250. See text accompanying notes 181-97 supra.
251. 427 U.S. at 314 n.7.
252. Id. at 316-17. The attack upon the failure to use the more precise test drew some strength
from the lack of evidence in the record indicating that individual testing lost its predictive value after
age 50. Id. at 326 n.6. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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made rule under examination was accepted by mistake and is in conflict
with its historical antecedents. 2" An abstract principle of contract law that
there be mutuality of obligation to establish more than a relationship
terminable at will can, in today's world, hardly serve as a basis for
permitting injury to an interest as important as that of an employee in
continued employment and continued employability.
Conceivably, the special problems created by use of the spoils system
in government hiring might provide a basis for distinguishing between the
job protection of employees in the public sector and employees in the
private sector. It should be noted, however, that that rationale is weakened
by the recent rapid growth of statutorily mandated collective bargaining in
the public sector, which has widened the disparity of treatment by
providing a duplicative protection ofjob security. Conceivably one might
argue that a rational basis for the distinction existing between the
protection required for employees in the private sector who are
represented by unions and those private sector employees who are
unorganized is that federal labor law policy has encouraged the use of
collective bargaining in the private sector.254 Again, however, the history
of the development of the duty of fair representation indicates that this was
not its purpose.2" And imposition on employers of a duty to bargain about
the economic demands of unions as well as individual grievances hardly
suggests a congressional determination that the needs of our economy
require preservation of employer power to deal with employees free from
legal restraints. To the contrary, at least since 1935 our national labor
policy has been based on the assumption that government must intervene
on the side of employees to protect them from possible abuse of the power
of employers.
Indeed, the broad range of prohibitions against various types of
discrimination found in recently enacted federal and state statutes reflects
repeated, legislative judgment that our economy can afford the cost of
limiting arbitrary use of power by employers. The absence of a universal
prohibition against the arbitrary use of power by employers is explainable
by the manner in which legislatures respond to pressures created by
interest groups. There has been no deliberate legislative choice to preserve
the authoritarian powers of employers. Legislatures certainly are not
required to act to cure all the evils of society, but when they have acted the
statutory pattern they leave should meet a standard of rationality.
Is there a rational basis for requiring an employer who has discharged
,a machine operator upon discovery that he has an epileptic condition to
253. See text accompanying notes 4 and 63-68 supra.
254. See the statement of findings and declaration of policy of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
255. See text accompanying notes 112-19 supra, indicating thejudicial source of the duty and its
recognition as a matter of statutory construction so as to avoid serious constitutional questions
concerning conferral of such broad powers on private organizations.
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prove that the operator cannot safely perform thejob but not to require an
employer to prove that inability to perform the machine operator's job in
fact justified the discharge of a person of normal health? Human freedom
and personal dignity may be served by prohibiting discharge from
employment because of a homosexual preference, but is the interest of
society so much greater in those cases than it is when an employee's
reputation for workmanship or simple honesty is severely injured by an
unjust discharge? Is it rational to require an employer to hire a person with
a record of criminal conviction that is not job related but to permit the
discharge of an employee on mere suspicion of dishonesty? Current social
pressures make it unlikely that there will be a retreat from those cases
holding that sexual harassment of women is a violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,256 but should the protection of a woman s
employment rest on the tenuous proposition that this was a form of
discrimination that Congress intended to end? Racial discrimination is
undoubtedly more pervasive in our society than generalized employer
tyranny, but is it rational to require an employer to prove that the
discharge of a black employee was based upon legitimate and objective
considerations, consistently applied, but make no such requirement for an
employee who cannot qualify as a member of a racial minority?.
A possible answer to questions of this sort is that the individuals
protected by the multitude of recently enacted statutes prohibiting
discrimination are, as members of "discrete and insular minorities, " 25
entitled to special legislative protection for the same reasons that the courts
apply a standard of strict judicial scrutiny to legislation that particularly
affects them. A persuasive rejoinder is that not all of the protected
classes-women for example-are discrete minorities, and the rationale
for the protective legislation must be that in today's society members of
those classes do not have the power to achieve what a sense of justice
indicates is properly theirs without the assistance of law. It is this same
assessment of the weakness of employees generally that has produced
protective legislation258 establishing minimum wages and limitations upon
hours of work, fixing safety standards, or promoting collective bargaining.
Given that general assessment and the patchwork of protections now
established, preservation of the common-law rule concerning employment
at will no longer seems rational.
There is an unusual aspect of the equal protection argument sketched
256. See note 33 supra.
257. The reference is, of course, to Justice Stone's famous footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,152-53 n.4(1938), which provided much of the basis for the Warren
Court's development of the concept ofsuspect classifications for purposes ofequal protection analysis.
258. Some of that legislation-e.g., minimum wage laws-does reflect the desire of organized
labor to protect itself from the market weakness of unorganized employees, thus demonstrating the
presence of political and economic strength in the labor force. Nevertheless, the abundance of
protective labor legislation stands as proof that employees generally are weak and deserving of legal
protection.
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here that deserves brief mention. The inequality in protection from
arbitrary discharge afforded different groups of employees in our society
becomes most obvious when attention is given to both federal and state
law, and is correspondingly less conspicuous if attention is given only to
one body of law. But when a challenge is made to a principle of law it would
seem that an assessment of that challenge requires that attention be given
to the total setting, both legal and factual, in which that principle
operates. 259 State courts have accordingly recognized the necessity of
conforming common-law rules applicable to private disputes to the
evolving standards of society for determining what equal protection
requires.
An example may be found in the recent use of equal protection
arguments to invalidate automobile guest statutes in a number of states. 60
The statutes limit the liability of owners and operators to social guests
259. See the opinion ofJustice Schaefer in Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 I11. 2d 60,203 N.E.2d
573 (1973).
260. Other examples may be given. Thus, prior to 1950 courts in this country uniformly denied a
woman damages for loss of consortium from one who had negligently injured her husband, W.
PROSSER, supra note 20, at 894-95. In that year the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered such a claim and found the reasons for denial to be unpersuasive. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). Since that time the clearly discernible trend
of the decisions has been to give recognition to such claims. W. PROS .ER, supra note 20, at 895-96. A
significant factor in producing that change in the law has been the conclusion that denial to a wife of
damages for loss of consortium in a state that allows husbands such a recovery would constitute denial
of equal protection of the law. See, e.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp.,499 F.2d 835,838 (10th Cir.
1974); Mann v. Golden, 428 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D. Kan. 1977); Karczewski v. Baltimore & O,R.R., 274
F. Supp. 169, 179-80 (N.D. Il1. 1967); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820, 821 (W.D.
Mich. 1966); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40,45 (Fla. 1971); Hastings v. James River Acrie No. 2337-
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d 747,751 (N.D. 1976); Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67,69,
239 N.E.2d 235, 236 (1968). It is significant that this conclusion was reached by a number of courts
without a holding by the Supreme Court that sex is a suspect classification, See Frontiero v,
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which only four Justices were willing to consider sex to be a suspect
classification.
Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois has also demonstrated that equal protection
arguments may invalidate a legislatively created pattern of separate statutes forlack of a rational basis
in the distinctions drawn. The Supreme Court of Illinois abolished the tort immunity of municipal
corporations in 1959 by its decision in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 111, 2d
1i, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). Anticipating a broad application of the Molitor decision, the Illinois
legislature enacted a number of laws dealing with the tort liability of various governmental units, The
statutes set different levels of liability, different periods of limitations, and various notice requirements,
which would have produced substantially different results for persons injured in the same manner by
employees of different governmental units. See Comment, Governmental Immunity In Illinois: The
Molitor Decision and the Legislative Reaction, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 588 (1959). After reviewing the maze
created by the legislation thus adopted, Justice Schaefer concluded that the pattern created bore no
discernible relationship to the realities of life and that a statute establishing complete immunity for a
park district was therefore arbitrary and unconstitutionally discriminated against the injured plaintiff,
Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32111. 2d 60,203 N.E.2d 573 (1965). The view was reaffirmed in subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois concerning private schools. See Cleary v. Catholic Diocese,
57 I11. 2d 384, 312 N.E.2d 635 (1974); Haymes v. Catholic Bishop, 41111.2d 336,243 N.E,2d 203 (1969).
More recently, in 1975, an equal protection attack that necessitated an examination of a range of
statutes provided the basis for invalidation by the Supreme Court of Washington of a special statute of
limitations for tort suits against counties. See Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975).
In doing so the Washington court said what might, with only slight change, be said of statutes limiting
the immunity of employers to claims of persons employed under conttacts terminable at will: "Once
sovereign immunity has been waived, even partially, any legislative classifications made with reference
thereto will be constitutional only if they conform to the equal protecti on guarantees of the state and
federal constitutions." Id. at 890, 540 P.2d at 1368.
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injured in automobile accidents, and usually require proof of gross
negligence or intentional injury to establish liability on the part of an
owner or operator. The rationale usually offered for the enactment of such
a statute is that it will promote hospitality and protect insurance
companies from fraudulent and collusive suits brought by social guests
against friendly host-drivers. The development is significant because in
1929 the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the constitutionali-
ty of a Connecticut guest statute under the rational basis test for equal
protection purposes, noting that it was "not so evident that no grounds
exist for the distinction" between guests and other passengers.26'
In Brown v. Merlo2 62 the Supreme Court of California found the
justification for an automobile guest statute to be inadequate in
contemporary society under both federal and state standards for equal
protection. For present purposes it should be noted that the Court
specifically stated that it could not confine its view to the operation of the
specific statute under attack, but was instead required to judge the
operation of the statute against the background of other legislative,
administrative, and judicial directives governing the rights of similarly
situated persons.263 That analysis led the California court to conclude that
there was no rational basis for making a distinction between the protection
accorded automobile guests and the protection accorded by California law
to other guests or recipients of hospitality.
Although the Brown v. Merlo rationale has gained acceptance in
several states, 264 a somewhat larger number of courts that have recently
considered equal protection attacks upon automobile guest statutes have
disagreed with the Supreme Court of California, some of them relying
upon the 1929 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
challenge to the Connecticut statute.265 Nevertheless, the record of
successful challenges on equal protection grounds to automobile guest
261. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1929).
262. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
263. Id. at 862, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
264. Some state supreme courts have agreed with the Supreme Court of California that
automobile guest statutes violate both federal and state standards of equal protection. SeeThompson
v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974);
Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975); McGeehanv. Bunch,88 N.M.308,
540 P.2d 238 (1975). One state intermediate appellate court has reached the same conclusions. See
Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio App. 2d 163, 335 N.E.2d 373 (1974). Other state courts have held that
automobile guest statutes violate state standards of equal protection without passing upon the federal
question. See Bickford v. Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256,235 S.E.2d 743 (1977), aff'd, 240 Ga.255,240S.E.
2d 24 (1977); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636
(1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
265. Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1977); Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976); Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288,315 So. 2d 570 (1975); White v. Hughes,
257 Ark. 627,519 S.W.2d 70, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo.
346,527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (DeL 1974); Delaney v. Badame, 49 I1. 2d
168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971); Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976); Keasling v.
Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974) (5-4 decision); Botschv. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226N.W.2d
121 (1975); Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Or. 252,525 P.2d 99 (1974); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86
(S.D. 1975); Tisco v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883, (Utah),
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statutes suggests a receptivity on the part of state courts to such an attack
against the prevailing rule concerning employment at will. Rejection of the
rationale offered to support an automobile guest statute necessarily pits
the judgment of the judiciary against the judgment of the legislature that
enacted the statute, and thus raises questions of the proper role of the
judiciary in a representational democracy. Condemnation of a judicially
developed rule on equal protection grounds, particularly after considera-
tion is given to the changes which have recently occurred in the legal and
social environment in which the rule operates, would pose no similar
problems.
It is thus entirely proper and advisable that state and federal courts
examine the entire range of statutory and common-law regulation that
affects the employment relationship to determine whether the extension of
protection from termination of employment without cause to some
employees, but not others, constitutes a denial of equal protection to the
unprotected group-namely, nonunionized employees in the private
sector working under a contract with an indefinite term. The denial
appears to constitute a deprivation of equal protection, because there is no
rational basis for denyingj ob protection to some employees while granting
it to others.
V. JUDICIAL CREATIVITY IN A PRIVATE LAW AREA
Even if the arguments developed above fail to persuade courts that the
rule currently applied to employment for an indefinite term is un-
constitutional, they may nonetheless achieve their purpose if they induce
courts to give serious consideration on the merits to the suitability of that
rule in contemporary society. Viewed as a problem of private law, the
matter falls in an area in which judicial creativity is appropriate and indeed
required if the common law, in conformance with its great traditions, is to
be adapted to the changing conditions of society.
266
The change proposed (or taking place) is undoubtedly an important
appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974); Blrewer v. Copeland, 86 Wash.
2d 58, 542 P.2d 445 (1975) (5-4 decision).
Even the Supreme Court of California may have modified its stance somewhat following
legislative reenactment of a portion of the automobile guest statute. See Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d
514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976).
Thus far, the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to hear any cases in which lower
courts have sustained automobile guest statutes against an equal protection attack. See Sidle v.
Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976); White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627,519
S.W.2d 70, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Hill v. Garner, 277 Or. 641,561 P.2d 1016 (1977),
appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 989 (1977); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah), appeal dismissed 419
U.S. 810, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974).
266. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra. See also Morgane v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375 (1970), in which the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a right of action forwrongful
death under general maritime law, overruling a common-law rule of doubtful origins that had become
inconsistent with the policies of modern maritime law. In doing so it had to reject an argument that
Congress had intended to preclude judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death by enactment of
particularized federal wrongful death statutes, the Death on the High Seas Act and the Jones Act. Id. at
393-403. It found in these and the many state wrongful death statutes a general policy of affording such
a remedy, even though the statutes did not cover the particular claim before it. Id. at 390-92.
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one, but that should not deter the judiciary. Its significance cannot be
much more far-reaching than the changes made by the judiciary with
respect to products liability in this century. In 1916 Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 267 abolished the requirement that there
be privity of contract for liability for harm caused by negligently
manufactured products. In 1960 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
eliminated the requirement of proof of negligence for a products liability
case by its decision in Henningsen v. Bloonfield Motors, Inc.,278
camouflaging its creative role with terminology of implied warranty. In
1962 Justice Traynor openly acknowledged the creative role of the courts
in his opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 69 placing strict
liability in tort on a manufacturer who places a defective product on the
market. The rule was accepted by the American Law Institute in 1964270
and incorporated as section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts. It is
now the rule in almost all of the states .27 The momentous change was
made by the judiciary while legislatures stood unmoved by society's need
for change. State legislatures did not make the change in products liability
law, needed as it was for contemporary society, for the same reason that
legislatures are unlikely to change the rule relating to employment for an
indefinite term: consumers, like unorganized employees, do not constitute
a lobby or an organized interest group capable of exerting the pressure
necessary to obtain legislative action.
It is instructive to note that the judiciary did not profess clairvoyance
regarding all the consequences of the change to a strict tort liability rule at
the time the change was made. Indeed, Justice Traynor, who played such
an important role in bringing about the change, acknowledged several
years after his decision in Greenman that no definition of "defect" had yet
been formulated which would resolve all the cases. 2 And the problem of
what is a defect giving rise to strict tort liability still continues to trouble the
courts.273 But the change was made, and undoubtedly it was a needed
change that produced a rule better serving society than the rule it
displaced. The example should encourage judicial creativity with respect
to the problem of employment at will.
As Professor Summers has pointed out,274 if the judiciary opts to
require hearing on the merits of a discharge, there is a large body of
267. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
268. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
269. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Justice Traynor had much earlier
stated his view in a concurring opinion that the principle governing products liability should be that of
strict liability in tort. Escolav. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,24 Cal. 2d453,461, 150 P.2d 436,440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
270. 41 A.L.I. Proceedings 349 (1964). See REsTTEmENrT (SECON'D) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
271. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 98, at 657-58.
272. Traynor, The Ways and Means ofDefective Producisand Strict Liability,32T,:NN. L REv.
363, 367. (1965).
273. Barkerv. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d413,573 P.2d443,143 Cal. Rptr. 225(1978); See Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
274. See note 8 supra.
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substantive and procedural rulings by arbitrators that is easily convertible
into the law governing an employer's power to discharge or discipline
employees. The Bureau of National Affairs is currently publishing its
seventieth volume of selected labor arbitration decisions; Commerce
Clearing House is currently publishing its thirty-seventh volume. Other
labor arbitration services also report awards. Approximately one-third of
those reported decisions deal with discharge or discipline. In addition,
there is a substantial body of case law concerning what constitutes cause
for discharge for the purpose of entitlement to unemployment in-
surance. 27 In short, there is a host of substantive and procedural decisions
considering discharge and discipline cases for which there was no parallel
when the judiciary opted to apply a rule of strict liability in products
liability cases.
Even if that body of law were not available, there would be no cause
for judicial diffidence. A tort law analogy is apt; only slight adjustment
need be made from the concept of the reasonably prudent person to the
reasonably prudent employer to develop a workable test of whether a
discharge or discipline was justifiable.
State courts have already begun to limit the power of employers to
discharge under contracts of employment terminable at will. As long ago
as 1959 an intermediate court of appeals in California recognized that the
rule permitting termination of employment at will for any reason was not
entirely satisfactory in today's society. In Petermann v. Teamsters Local
396276 the plaintiff alleged that he had been diseharged from his
employment under a contract terminable at will because he failed to
commit perjury at a state legislative committee hearing. The court
concluded that such a discharge so conflicted with the public policy of the
state that it was necessary to deny the employer its generally unlimited
right to discharge. It therefore recognized the plaintiff's claim as valid. In
1973 the Supreme Court of Indiana had before it a suit in which the
plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for filing a workmen's
compensation claim.277 The court concluded that the discharge was
actionable, treating it as a statutorily prohibited "device" for defeating
claims. More recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that a
discharge for seeking workmen's compensation was improper, even
though the Michigan statute did not contain a prohibition of such
discharges.278 Public policy required modification of the common-law
rule.
In 1974 the case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.179 was decided by the
275. See note 17 supra.
276. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
277. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E,2d 425 (1973).
278. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
279. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Plaintiff was a married woman
working on the night shift. She alleged and presented evidence tending to
show that she was discharged because she refused to go out with her
foreman, and that he, conniving with the personnel manager, therefore
brought about her discharge from employment. The New Hampshire
court concluded that "a termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public
good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract. ' 280 According-
ly, it affirmed a jury verdict for damages in the amount of the wages lost by
the plaintiff following her discharge.
In 1975 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a discharge from
employment at will for serving on jury duty was a prima facie tort for
which damages should be awarded because of the community interest in
encouraging jury service.28' In 1977 the Supreme Court of Idaho
conceptually disapproved termination of employment at will when the
discharge is motivated by a consideration that contravenes public policy,
but found no such motivation in the case before it.282 In the same year,
different panels of an Illinois intermediate appellate court disagreed about
whether an employer was liable for discharging an employee because he
filed a workmen's compensation claim, certifying the two cases to the
supreme court for resolution of the conflict.283 The Supreme Court of
Washington recently characterized as a compelling issue the question
whether the limitation recognized in Monge on an employer's power to
terminate employment should be accepted in Washington law, but found
that the facts of the case before it did not require it to reach the question.2"
Receptivity to such a change is suggested by the court's statement that the
issue "is one that must be left for another day and different facts."285
Not all courts have been willing to follow Petermann or Monge. Soon
after the decision in Monge, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard a
case in which the plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for reporting
to a corporate officer who was also a personal friend that the corporation
was marketing metal tubing for a purpose for which it had not been
adequately tested.28 6 Over a strong and appealing dissent, the Court
rejected the attack on the rule, permitting discharge without cause by a
280. Id. at 133,316 A.2d at551. The holdingofMongewas recently followed by the First Circuit
in a diversity case. Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1977).
281. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). The Oregon court, however, refused to
extend its holding to a case in which the discharge could not be characterized as a matter ofcommunity
interest. See Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
282. Jackson v. Minodoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977).
283. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 IlL App. 3d 1016,366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977); Leach v. Lauhoff
Grain Co., 51 I11. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977).
284. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
285. Id. at 898, 568 P.2d at 770.
286. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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vote of four to three. In 1977 the Supreme Court of Alabama, also by a
divided vote, rejected the claim of a person who alleged that she had been
discharged from employment because of her refusal to falsify certain
medical records of a psychiatric service.2 87 Other recent decisions have
rejected similar attacks.288
Monge of course goes beyond those cases in which discharges were
found to be wrongful because they conflicted with a state policy established
by statute. But not even Monge requires an employer to prove that there
was just cause for discharge or discipline, as must be done when a case is
presented to an arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement.289
Monge would not preclude discharges that result from negligent
investigation, failure properly to appraise the significance of the
employee's conduct, or other inadequate but innocent reasons.
Nevertheless, the movement has begun, and almost certainly will continue,
as the employee's rights under an indefinite term contract are compared to
the protection afforded by laws applicable to the employment relation.
VI. WHAT PROCESS IS DuE AND FEASIBLE
Provision for review on the merits of cases of discharge and discipline
for persons now working under contracts terminable at will might result in
a substantial increase in the caseload of American courts.290 In collective
bargaining relationships, a grievance procedure produces a settlement of
most of the cases which otherwise would go to arbitration. Moreover,
access to the arbitration forum is largely under the control of a union, and
hence the decision to arbitrate is not made solely by the employee whose
economic interests suggest pursuit of a claim to that ultimate remedy. 291
The absence in the unorganized sector of employment of a grievance
procedure in which employees receive professional evaluation of the merits
of their case might require a higher proportion of cases to go to trial than
the proportion of cases taken to arbitration. On the other hand, the review
system provided for federal civil servants appears to have suffered, not
from excessive use by employees, but from insufficient utilization, because
the absence of a grievance procedure leaves many employees without
professional advice concerning available remedies.292 In other contexts,
such as settlement of tort claims, compromise of tax liabilities, or plea
bargaining in criminal cases, private attorneys have shown their ability to
287. Hinrich v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
288. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Pirre v. Printing
Devs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507,573
P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977). Scroghan v. Kraftco, 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977),
289. See note 45 supra.
290. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
291. See notes 116-19 and accompanying text supra.




settle most cases without full hearings.293 They would probably learn to do
the same in cases of discharge or discipline. In any event, employees in the
unorganized sector of the American work force will not be on equal terms
with those represented by unions unless a full hearing on the merits is
available to them in the event that negotiation fails to produce a
settlement.
Courts might, of course, devise hearing procedures that afford
minimal due process short of a full judicial-type hearing. In Goss v.
Lopez294 the Supreme Court held that a student was denied due process
when he was temporarily suspended from school without being told what
he was accused of having done and having been given no opportunity to
explain his version of the facts. The rudimentary hearing required was
notice of the charge and an opportunity to speak. A similar requirement in
the employment context could be enforced without unduly burdening
either the courts or employers. Of course, in the employment context this
procedure would suffer in that the discharging supervisor would frequently
be the judge in his own case; this was a factor that led three Justices to
believe that the pretermination hearing given a federal civil servant did not
meet due process standards even though a full evidentiary hearing was
available after the termination. 295
Perhaps courts could require employers to provide review by a higher
supervisor of a decision to initiate discharge action unless the employer
could show that personnel limitations made such review impossible. Such
a requirement might produce ceremonial review unless the courts insisted
that the basis for a discharge and its rationale be stated, permitting the
court to review the reasonableness of the decision to discharge.
Comparable remedies have been developed in other contexts without the
imposition of a full judicial hearing. For example, in Kosty v. Lewis2 96 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the trustees
of United Mine Workers Retirement Fund had broad discretion in
determining pension eligibility standards, but review of the action taken
and the reasons offered in support led the court to conclude that the
trustees had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in changing eligibility
standards without giving notice to those employees previously eligible, so
that they would have an opportunity to retire.297 The technique applied to
decisions to discharge or discipline might produce judicial review
comparable to that required by the Supreme Court for administrative
293. C. PECK, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
NEGOTIATION, UNIT FIVE 1-2 (The Labor Law Group 1972).
294. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
295. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 216 (1974) (Marshall, Douglas, & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
296. 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964). Of course, the court in
Kosty found support for what it did in the traditions of equity supervision of trusts.
297. 319 F.2d at 749.
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decisions that are not based upon formal findings of fact made after a
judicial-type hearing. Illustrative is the judicial review given a decision of
the Secretary of Transportation to permit construction of a highway
through a city park298 or the decision of the Comptroller General to license
the establishment of a new national bank. 299 Affidavits and testimony
supplement the written record of the decisional process and make possible
a determination whether the decision was made on a legitimate and
rational basis.
Such a limited review could bring to unorganized employees the
benefits of the system of corrective or progressive discipline frequently
required by arbitrators in the organized sector.300 Corrective or
progressive discipline requires that employees be informed of the existence
of a rule, violation of which will lead to disciplinary measures and the
possibility of discharge. The first violation may merit no more than a
warning, whereas the second violation may result in suspension for a
substantial period of time. Only after the employer has thus impressed
upon the employee that serious consequences follow violation of the rule
may the employer impose the ultimate penalty of discharge. Exceptions
are of course recognized for employee conduct that is outrageous and
indefensible, such as violent assault on a supervisor or theft of valuable
property. Adherence to such a system obviously has advantages for
employees and is also valuable to employers in that it preserves their
investment in the training of employees.
The imposition of such minimal due process requirements by the
judiciary would very likely produce a legislative response recognizing a
substantive right to continued employment absent "cause" for discharge
and establishing a detailed procedural scheme for employees who have
been discharged or disciplined. Indeed, some courts have expressly
recognized that they may perform a catalytic function and have openly
called upon legislatures for enactment of legislation to establish
procedures that they could not devise independently.3' A desirable result
might be enactment of the statute proposed by Professor Summers,
making arbitration of discharge and discipline cases available to
employees generally.
30 2
The legislative process does enjoy an advantage over the judicial
process in the manner in which it can establish classifications and make
exceptions that generally serve the purposes of justice while accom-
298. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
299. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
300. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 13, at 630-32; Summers, Individual Protection,
supra note 8, at 504-06.
301. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1977); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962). A court may also use the technique of prospective
overruling to give warning of an impending change to those who would otherwise be adverscly aftected
by a change in the law. See Peck, supra note 9, at 301-02.
302. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 8.
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modating conflicting interests. Thus, a legislative solution to the problem
here discussed could establish a size limit for employers who are obligated
to establish just cause for discipline or discharge, giving recognition to the
likelihood that in small operations the factor of personal relations weighs
much more heavily than it does in today's typical employment relation.
The legislative solution could also establish definite but generally
reasonable periods for probationary employment, a workable definition of
temporary employment, exceptions for policymaking or confidential
employees and high level supervisors, and required notice periods for those
who are not protected from discharge without cause.
A possible legislative choice would be to broaden the jurisdiction of
existing state boards or agencies to pass upon all cases concerning claims
of discriminatory or unjust employer conduct. A single investigation could
serve to determine whether there was just cause for discharge or discipline
or whether the action was taken for any of the currently prohibited
reasons. An agency with such a broadened jurisdiction could, with proper
legislative support, develop a corps of investigative officers who would
perform a function comparable to that performed by union officials in the
grievance and arbitration procedures established by collective bargaining.
In the end, the result would be creation of an agency not unlike the
specialized labor courts that have functioned in Europe for a number of
303years.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law concerning employment in the United
States permits employers or their representatives to discipline and
discharge employees in a manner that is not consistent with the standards
of a civilized society. Indeed, it is not consistent with the standards that
have been adopted to govern a broad range of particularized reasons
previously utilized by employers in making employment decisions. That
the law will be changed is almost certain. The author hopes what has been
written here will help to persuade courts that they should abandon a rule
governing employment that does not accord human dignity the value it
deserves and usually receives in American law.
303. Id. at 509-19.
1979]

